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This dissertation studies covert wireless communications where a transmitter (Al-
ice) intends to transmit messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob) such that the presence
of the message is hidden from an attentive warden (Willie). Here we consider perti-
nent aspects of covert communications that focus on moving such systems closer to
implementation. For example, previous studies use the standard discrete-time com-
munication model when analyzing covert communications, since this is commonly
assumed without loss of generality in standard communication theory. However, it
is not clear that such a model captures the salient aspects of the continuous-time
covert communications problem. A power detector that is optimal for the warden in
a discrete-time covert communications scenario may not be optimal on a continuous-
time model. Thus, it is of interest to consider this more realistic model for physical
channels. After analyzing a power optimization problem using the standard discrete-
time model, we move to the key part of system implementation: the instantiation in
vii
true continuous-time systems of the discrete-time models studied to this point in the
literature. A key goal is to examine Willie’s detection capability on a continuous-time
model and study how the limits of covert communications change from the discrete-
time case. In particular, we show that detectors for Willie can benefit from the
continuous-time setting and outperform detectors based on the discrete-time model;
not surprisingly, this has a significant impact on the true covert throughput of the
system. Nevertheless, we establish constructions such that efficient covert communi-
cations can still be achieved in a continuous-time model, and prove the fundamental
limit on the covert communication rate. After considering the continuous-time prob-
lem in detail, we then turn to addressing another limitation of previous work - the
requirement for an intentional jammer to facilitate efficient covert communication.
Instead, we consider how to exploit a pre-existing interference source - a radar - to
achieve covert communication. We establish a covert communication scheme in such
an environment, and analyze the corresponding covert rate. Finally, we consider the
use of a detection technique similar to that in the covert communications problem,




ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Covert Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Power Adaptation in Covert Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Covert Communications on a Continuous-Time Model . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.4 Covert communications under the cover of a radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.5 Detecting Quantized Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. OPTIMAL POWER ADAPTATION IN COVERT
COMMUNICATION WITH AN UNINFORMED
JAMMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 System Model and Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 Receivers and Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.3 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 AWGN Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Average Covertness Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
ix
2.3.2 Instantaneous Covertness Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Rayleigh Fading Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.1 Average Covertness Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2 Instantaneous Covertness Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS ON A CONTINUOUS-TIME
MODEL WITH AN UNINFORMED JAMMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 System Model and Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.2 Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.2.1 Willie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.2.2 Bob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Interference Cancellation Detection by Willie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.2 Willie’s Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.3 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Achievable Covert Communications: Perfect Frame Synchronization
between Alice and the Jammer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4.3 Optimal Hypothesis Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.4 Covertness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.5 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Extension to the Case Without Frame Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5.1.1 Alice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5.1.2 Jammer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
x
3.5.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5.3 Optimal Hypothesis Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5.4 Covert Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7.1 Discussion of the Bandwidth of the Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7.2 Proof of Sufficient Statistic at Genie-Aided Willie Using the
LRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.7.3 Proof of M1 Being a Sufficient Statistic for the Genie-Aided
Willie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4. COVERT COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE COVER OF A
RADAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 System Model and Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.2 Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Communication Waveform against Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.1 Waveform Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.2 Willie’s Detection Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Covertness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5. FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS IN DETECTING WHETHER A
SIGNAL HAS BEEN QUANTIZED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 System Model and Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Optimal Test and the Probability of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4 Achievability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5 Converse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113




1.1 ROC curves of the standard power detector and the successive
cancellation detector employed by Willie in the
Alice-Bob-Willie-jammer scenario with AWGN channels. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Alice-Bob-Willie model: Alice attempts to transmit reliably and
covertly to Bob in the presence of a warden Willie. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 System model: With help from a jammer, Alice attempts to transmit
reliably and covertly to Bob in the presence of a warden Willie. . . . . . 17
2.2 Average outage probability in the case under the extra instantaneous
covertness constraint when Alice employs optimal power
adaptation, TCI, and truncated constant power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Power allocations for the optimal scheme, TCI and the truncated
constant scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Average outage probability under both the average and the
instantaneous covertness constraints when Alice employs optimal
power adaptation, TCI, and truncated constant power The
jammer employs constant power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Average outage probability under both the average and the
instantaneous covertness constraints when Alice employs optimal
power adaptation, TCI, and truncated constant power the jammer
employs uniformly distributed power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 System model: With help from a jammer, Alice attempts to transmit
reliably and covertly to intended recipient Bob in the presence of
a warden Willie. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Illustration of the time slots, each of length T . Alice may (or may
not) transmit in slot [0, T ], and Willie attempts to detect her
presence in that slot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
xii
3.3 Model of interference cancellation at Willie in a covert
communication system in the presence of a jammer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Receiver operating characteristic of the interference cancellation
detector and the standard power detector (implemented in a
continuous-time covert communication system) when the
jammer’s SNR is 20, 15 and 10 dB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5 Willie’s received power levels from Alice and the jammer. An impulse
means a power level chosen by either Alice or the jammer within
slot [0, T ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Markov chain illustrating the transition from Alice’s decision D on
transmission, to Willie’s observed signal z(t). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Pulse trains sent from Alice and the jammer over [0, T ]. An impulse
means a pulse sent by Alice or the jammer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.8 Markov chain illustrating the transition from Alice’s decision D on
transmission, to Willie’s observed signal z(t). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1 System model: Alice attempts to transmit covertly to Bob in a
communication system with an illuminating radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Comparison of the eigenvalues (in dB scale) of SSH when n = 5000
and n = 20000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.1 System framework: Alice sends a real-valued vector X and an
observer attempts to classify his observed vector Y as either a
vector X + N of the original signal through the channel or a
vector Q(X) + N of the quantized signal through the





Secrecy in modern communications plays a crucial role in many applications. In a
typical wireless communication system, secrecy is often obtained through encryption.
In particular, a message is encoded before being transmitted to the legitimate receiver
in order to protect it from potential eavesdroppers. A generated key is given to the
legitimate receiver to decrypt the received message. In contrast, the eavesdropper
has difficulty decrypting the message without possessing the key. Although modern
communication technologies enable advanced algorithms for information encryption
that require considerable computational resources and skills for the eavesdropper to
decrypt the message, this standard cryptographic security is often not sufficient. This
is due to two main reasons: 1) adversaries can enhance their decipher capabilities
over time as technologies improve, putting current and especially past encrypted
transmissions in danger; and 2) adversaries can apply side-channel attacks [1] to infer
message content without acquiring the exact decrypted message. Thus, it is often
desirable to achieve information-theoretic security that does not depend on unproven
assumptions about computational hardness.
In information-theoretic secrecy, physical layer encryption exploits the wireless
channel to achieve provable and unbreakable security. In the 1970s, Wyner posed the
Alice-Bob-Eve problem where Alice wants to send secret messages to Bob without
being decoded by Eve [2]. Wyner defined the secrecy capacity that measures the
level of security of a communication system - the rate at which Alice can secretly
1
transmit information to Bob. He showed that secure communication is possible if
the channel from Alice to Bob is statistically better than that from Alice to Eve.
Later Csiszár and Körner [3] showed that secure communication is possible even if
the channel from Alice to Eve is statistically better. The key of the information
theoretic approach to communication security is to exploit the difference between the
channel to the legitimate receiver and the channel to the adversary or eavesdropper,
using the randomness of the physical medium (e.g., channel noise and fading), to
benefit the legitimate receiver.
In addition to the vulnerability to developments in decipher power, in many real-
life scenarios, the very existence of the transmission arouses suspicion. For example
in military communications, the detection of a transmission may reveal an activity in
that region, or in Internet of things (IoT) applications, the detection of a transmission
can compromise a user’s location privacy. A practical way of hiding the existence of a
message is to conceal it within another message. This is termed steganography. The
first recorded uses of steganography were mentioned by the ancient Greek historian
Herodotus [4]. One example is that the spartan king Demaratus sent a warning about
a forthcoming attack to Greece by writing it directly on the wooden backing of a wax
tablet (commonly used then as reusable writing surfaces) before applying its beeswax
surface. Nowadays, steganography is widely used in the digital world for hiding
communications in document files, image files, programs or protocols. However, in
the analog world, applying steganography to communication systems can be difficult
due to the existence of noise. Another issue is that steganography cannot be applied
when there is no cover text to hide the covert message, which is often true for many
applications where the existence of the transmission needs to be hidden, such as the
examples mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Covert communications can be employed to address the problem. The intuition
of covert communications is simple: the transmitter must send a signal power strong
2
enough for the receiver to receive and decode the message, but weak enough so that
the adversary cannot detect its presence. The research challenges are to determine
under what conditions covert communications can be achieved, and to find the the-
oretical limits on the covert transmission rate. This can help the transmitter and
the receiver evaluate their abilities in covert transmissions (whether it is capable to
transmit covert and reliable messages and what transmission rate can be employed).
Analogously, this also helps adversaries to evaluate their detection capabilities. It
will eventually help us to design technologies that enable or prevent covert communi-
cations in real-life scenarios. Many studies have been done on covert communications
to study the fundamental limits (as a function of the blocklength of the transmitted
message) in a wide range of scenarios, which we will introduce in detail in the next
section. Some works take other perspectives, such as considering an infinite block-
length to better understand the underlying mechanisms of the covert communication
problem. They provide inspiration for our work on optimal power adaptation in covert
communications in the second chapter where we question how to efficiently allocate
power to the transmitter such that the receiver can receive the message reliably under
a covertness constraint.
However, almost all previous work, including our power adaptation work, focused
on a discrete-time model, which assumes an equivalence to the actual continuous-time
model of interest since a discrete-time equivalent model is often sufficient for digital
communications. Given a pulse-shaped baseband signal, by the Nyquist folding cri-
terion, the receiver can extract all of the information of the signal by sampling at a
certain rate, resulting in no intersymbol interference (ISI). But in covert communi-
cations, sampling at a higher rate has utility for signal detection. Since commonly
generated signals are periodic and do not resemble Gaussian noise, it allows the eaves-
dropper to extract features in the transmitted signal that are different from the noise
to detect the presence of a transmission. This may provide more information to the
3
Figure 1.1: ROC curves of the standard power detector and the successive cancellation
detector employed by Willie in the Alice-Bob-Willie-jammer scenario with AWGN
channels.
eavesdropper in comparison to the discrete-time model. In a discrete-time model,
Bash et al. in [5] and [6] proved that Alice can transmit at most O(
√
n) covert bits
to Bob in n channel uses of an AWGN channel. Although Lee and Baxley in [7]
showed that O(n) covert bits can be achieved if Willie is unaware of his background
noise, Goeckel et al. in [37] stated that Willie can estimate his noise through a large
collection of observations and hence Alice can only achieve O(
√
n) covert bits. A
possible scenario to achieve O(n) covert bits in a discrete-time channel is provided
in [9] by Sobers et al. where an uninformed jammer is added to the system. How-
ever, in [10] and [11], the O(n) result is challenged in a continuous setting. By having
Willie employing a more advanced detector, the jammer’s power can be cancelled and
we revert to the O(
√
n) result. Considering a continuous-time model may changes
the fundamental limits of covert communications, but since some assumptions in [10]
and [11] may not hold in practice, a deeper understanding of the problem is needed
to help realize covert communications in real-life applications. Figure 1.1 provides
an example that compares the ROC curve of another advanced detector for Willie
4
(developed in Chapter 3) with that of the standard power detector (which is proved
optimal for a discrete-time model) in a continuous-time covert communication sys-
tem. This shows that the covert rates that can be achieved in actual continuous-time
channels are lower than those predicted in [9].
The above studies consider covert communications in an Alice-Bob-Willie-jammer
scenario where a friendly jammer is used as an interference source to assist Alice to
achieve covert communications, and in many cases, we need to have some control over
the jammer in order to help Alice. However, this may not be operable in many practi-
cal scenarios. For example in military communications, introducing a friendly jammer
will arouse suspicion. Therefore, it is desirable to develop covert communication sys-
tems that are able to exploit interference sources already existing in the environment.
In the fourth chapter, we will study covert communications in an environment with
an illuminating radar that will play the role of a jammer.
The job of a detector at the warden in a covert communication system is to decide
between hypotheses that either Alice is transmitting or not transmitting. Besides
covert communications, this kind of hypothesis testing is involved in many other areas
of wireless communications, e.g., in detecting quantized signals. Detecting quantized
signals is important since in many applications, such as network security or radar
systems, we want to know whether a received signal was sent directly by a friend,
or was recorded (hence quantized) by an adversary and then replayed. This problem
needs advanced study to learn the theoretical limits in signal detection, which will
help us evaluate the security level in such applications.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Covert Communications
In the basic model of covert communication shown in Figure 1.2, a transmitter
(Alice) attempts to reliably transmit messages to a receiver (Bob) without a warden
5
Figure 1.2: Alice-Bob-Willie model: Alice attempts to transmit reliably and covertly
to Bob in the presence of a warden Willie.
(Willie) detecting her communication. The original work by Bash et al. in [5] and [6]
demonstrates a square-root law (SRL) of the fundamental limits of covert commu-
nications over AWGN channels. They show that O(
√
n) bits in n channel uses of a
discrete-time channel can be transmitted covertly and reliably from Alice to Bob. In
terms of transmission power, O( 1√
n
) power can be employed by Alice for covert and
reliable communications. Beyond that power, Alice’s transmission will be detected
by Willie with high probability. Below that power, her message cannot be success-
fully decoded by Bob with small probability of error. Follow-on work has studied
covert communications and proved the SRL over various channel models. Che et
al. in [13] considered covert communications on Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs).
More generic Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) are considered by Wang et al.
in [15] and [16]. This work was also extended to classical-quantum channels in [17].
Many works in covert communications are based on models assuming that Alice
and Bob share a secret key that is unknown to Willie. Bloch studied the length
of the secret key needed to achieve the SRL in covert communications over DMCs
in [18] and [19]. He proved that the SRL can be achieved if Alice and Bob share on
O(
√
n)-bit key irrespective of the quality of the channels. If the Alice-to-Bob channel
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is better than the Alice-to-Willie channel, then the SRL can be achieved without a
secret key. Tahmasbi and Bloch also studied first- and second-order asymptotics for
covert communications with three different covertness metrics in [20] and [21]. Exact
first-order asymptotics are established for all metrics.
The aforementioned works all consider covert communications when Willie has
full knowledge of his channel statistics. We can also consider the case when there
are uncertainties at Willie, e.g., he is not sure of the background noise or additional
interference is involved. The results of many works show that a positive rate, i.e.,
O(n) bits in n channel uses, can be achieved. Lee et al. in [7, 22, 23] and Che et al.
in [14] found that if Willie is uncertain of his noise power, then Alice can achieve a
positive covert rate. However, the assumption that Willie’s receiver does not know
the noise power may not be true in real-life scenarios since Willie can estimate his
noise through a collection of channel observations when Alice does not transmit [37].
To achieve positive covert rate when Willie is certain about his noise power, Sobers
et al. introduced a scenario where an uninformed (does not have any coordination
with Alice) jammer is added in the communication system in [9, 11]. This jammer
randomly generates interference and creates uncertainties at Willie which allows a
positive covert rate for Alice. They also investigated covert communications over
fading channels in addition to AWGN channels in such a scenario. Our work in
Chapters 2 and 3 will be based on this scenario where an uninformed jammer is
added. One difference between this scenario and the scenario when Willie does not
know his received power is that the interference generated by the jammer not only
affects Willie, but also impacts Bob. Therefore, although a positive rate might be
achieved such as in [9], this scenario with a jammer does not necessarily guarantee a
higher covert rate than the basic Alice-Bob-Willie scenario with the same environment
settings. For example, when Bob is located relatively close to the jammer, the covert
rate will be degraded significantly.
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1.2.2 Power Adaptation in Covert Communications
Many works in covert communications focus on obtaining the scaling limits as a
function of the block length n. The authors in [24] take a different approach and
consider an infinite blocklength; they then ask what is the probability that channel
conditions are such that a communication is reliable and covert. We term this an
“outage” approach [25]- [27] which often captures the salient aspects of the problem
and can clearly illustrate the underlying mechanisms.
In [24], the authors use the outage approach to consider possible power adaptation
schemes at the transmitter to achieve covert communication. In particular, they
studied standard and truncated channel inversion (TCI) schemes, where Alice varies
her transmit power based on the channel from herself to Bob in order to keep the
received signal power at Bob a constant. The authors examine the performance in
terms of the achieved effective covert throughput and show that TCI outperforms the
standard channel inversion. However, [24] does not establish the optimality of the
scheme, and the parameters of the scheme need to be obtained numerically. Our work
in the second chapter will establish the exact optimal power adaptation schemes for
different scenarios.
1.2.3 Covert Communications on a Continuous-Time Model
Although covert communications have been intensively studied for the past few
years, some important issues are ignored. Almost all current research is based on a
discrete-time model where transmitters sends discrete symbols. In standard communi-
cation theory, it is commonly assumed that the discrete-time model is approximately
equivalent to a continuous-time model since, by sampling at the correct time instances,
the receiver is able to get exactly the original sent symbols with no intersymbol inter-
ference (ISI). However, the assumption on perfect symbol synchronization may not
always hold in practice. In addition, the generated continuous signals contain peri-
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odic features that can be made use of by the receiver in differentiating the signal from
Gaussian noise and/or interference. Based on this fact, a power detector for Willie
that is optimal in the discrete-time model may not still be optimal in the continuous-
time case. One example of a possible better detector is the cyclostationary detector
(CSD). CSDs are signal-presence detectors that exploit the cyclostationarity of digital
communication signals. It is particularly useful in detecting low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) signals. Gardner in [28]- [31] extensively researched CSDs and the optimal
CSDs for different modulation schemes. Kim et al. extended the study on CSDs and
introduced the cyclostationary approaches to both signal detection and classification
in cognitive radio in [32].
Although CSDs are efficient in extracting periodic features from a signal and hence
can perform detection in basic Alice-Bob-Willie scenarios, they may not work well
in the presence of a jammer in the system since the jammer also generates periodic
signals. However, there are still detectors we can explore that work better than a
power detector. Sobers et al. in [11] introduced a linear detector that exploits different
timing offsets between Alice’s and the jammer’s pulse shaped signals. However, this
detector only works for limited scenarios and requires that Willie have an accurate
estimate of the timing offsets of both Alice’s and the jammer’s signals. In the third
chapter, we will provide a different detector for Willie that works in more general
scenarios and does not require knowledge of Alice’s timing offset.
1.2.4 Covert communications under the cover of a radar
In covert communications, Willie attempts to determine whether he is only ob-
serving the background environment or a signal from Alice in that environment.
Hence, uncertainty about the environment helps Alice hide her transmission. Sobers
et al., [9], introduced a model with an interference source to achieve positive covert
rate: introducing an uninformed jammer to the system that randomly generates in-
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terference, hence providing the required uncertainty at Willie. It shows that Alice
can covertly transmit at most O(n) bits in n channel uses over both discrete-time
AWGN and block fading channels.
In many scenarios, the jammer is assumed to be an intentional jammer that coop-
erates with Alice to help her achieve covert communications on purpose [33]. However,
this require an active non-covert Alice-Bob teammate, which may be difficult to pro-
vide in some situations. For example, in military communications where a transmitter
attempts to covertly communicate with a receiver in enemy territory. In addition,
the jammer in [9] is itself not covert since the warden knows that the jammer is
present and potentially trying to hide something. Hence, it is often useful to exploit
an interference source that is already existing in the environment, such as radar emis-
sions [34,35] and other existing communication sources [36,37], so that Alice and Bob
can move into the area and hide under such interference.
The works [34, 35] by Blunt et al. introduces an intra-pulse radar-embedded
communication system where the transmitter attempts to covertly send transmis-
sion symbols to the radar. In order to achieve covertness, the transmission symbols
are embedded with the incident radar pulses, and are hidden behind the backscatter
induced by the radar reflections. The design of intra-pulse covert symbols based on
the incident radar waveform is studied in [34] such that the covert symbols are suffi-
ciently different from the ambient radar scattering to ensure acceptable bit error rate
(BER) but at the same time sufficiently similar to the scattering to avoid detection
by any adversary. Our work in the fourth chapter will exploit the idea of embedding
covert symbols with radar signal in a standard covert communication system, and
analyze the fundamental covert rate in such system.
10
1.2.5 Detecting Quantized Signals
In many scenarios it is important to know whether a received signal was sent
directly by a friend, or was recorded by an adversary and then replayed. Such an
attack could be the replay attack (or playback attack) in network security, where an
adversary records the transmitted message and replays it later to trick the receiver
into unauthorized operations. This kind of attack also occurs in radar jamming and
deception to protect targets from being detected by enemy radar systems. Extensive
research [78]- [81] has proposed methods to efficiently detect false signals that are
recorded and replayed in such fields. However, the fundamental limits of such attacks
with hardware imperfections has not been explored. The fifth chapter will initiate
a study on the theoretical limits in the detection of quantized signals. Learning the
fundamental thresholds for the characteristics of the hardware (quantizer) will provide
us with both theoretical insight and application utility.
1.3 Contributions
• Optimal Power adaptation in Covert Communications (Chapter 2):
We consider a covert communication system consisting of a transmitter Alice, a
legitimate receiver Bob, a warden Willie and an uninformed jammer that is not
coordinated with Alice. With the information about the gain on the channel be-
tween Alice and Bob, Alice can adapt her transmit power to this gain to achieve
a certain rate and meet the requirement of covertness such that Willie detects
the presence of the transmission with low probability. We seek to find the
optimal power adaptation that minimizes the average outage probability sub-
ject to the covertness constraint. We consider the following scenarios: 1) the
jammer-to-Willie channel is AWGN; and 2) the jammer-to-Willie channel ex-
periences Rayleigh fading. In both scenarios, we established the optimal power
adaptation schemes separately under two covertness constraints: 1) an aver-
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age covertness constraint; and 2) an instantaneous covertness constraint. We
proved that in both scenarios, the optimal scheme under the average covertness
constraint is truncated channel inversion. Under the instantaneous covertness
constraint, TCI is not optimal, and we have provided the exact optimal power
adaptation schemes. These schemes outperform standard approaches such as
TCI by reducing the average outage probability significantly.
• Covert Communications on a Continuous-Time Model (Chapter 3):
Dropping the assumption in most prior work that a discrete-time model in covert
communications is equivalent to a continuous-time model, we directly study the
Alice-Bob-Willie-jammer scenario on a continuous-time model in this work. We
first provide an interference cancellation detector for Willie, which is inspired
by co-channel interference cancellation techniques in cellular networks, that can
mitigate the jammer’s signal and detect Alice’s presence in a continuous-time
system. We show that this detector outperforms the standard power detector
implemented in a continuous-time system in various circumstances, and that
it does not require Willie to know Alice’s timing offset. Then, we prove that
covert communications can still be achieved with a continuous-time model re-
gardless of the choice of Willie’s receiver. In particular, given a time T , for a
continuous-time channel with asymptotic bandwidth W as T →∞, we establish
constructions such that O(WT ) information bits can be transmitted covertly
and reliably from Alice to Bob in T seconds.
• Covert communications under the cover of a radar (Chapter 4):
Instead of using a friendly jammer as an interference source to assist Alice to
achieve covert communications, in this work, we move Alice and Bob to an
environment with a pre-existing illuminating radar. We exploit the idea of
embedding covert symbols with radar signals and hide the transmission behind
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the radar clutter. We provide a design of covert communication waveforms
exploiting the radar signal. We also show that covert communications can be
achieved with such a communication scheme, and establish the theoretical limit
on the covert rate of transmission between Alice and Bob. In particular, we show
that O(n) bits can be transmitted covertly and reliably to Bob in n samples of
the radar signal.
• Detecting Whether a Signal Has Been Quantized (Chapter 5):
In many areas like network security or radar jamming and deception, it is im-
portant to know whether a received signal was sent directly by a friend, or was
recorded by an adversary and then replayed. In this work, we use a character-
istic of the recording, namely the quantization, to study if the replayed (quan-
tized) signal can be detected. In particular, we consider the requirements on
the quantizer to keep the quantization from being detected in additive Gaus-
sian noise. If a signal with length m is sent and a uniform quantizer with b
quantization bits is employed for recording, we prove that 2b = ω(
√
m) and a
quantizer span of ω(
√
lnm) is sufficient for the adversary to avoid detection;
that is, the probability of error Pe of the observer is bounded as Pe ≥ 12 − ε for
any ε > 0. Conversely, having 2b = O(
√
m) or a quantizer span of o(
√
lnm)
results in detection by the observer with high probability as m→∞.
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMAL POWER ADAPTATION IN COVERT
COMMUNICATION WITH AN UNINFORMED JAMMER
2.1 Introduction
While most secure communication focuses on preventing an adversary from de-
termining the content of a message, covert communication hides the existence of the
communication between Alice and Bob, which is important for some applications.
For example, in military communications the detection of a transmission may reveal
activity in the region, or in IoT applications, the detection of a transmission can
compromise a user’s location privacy.
Recent work studied the limits of reliable covert communication. In [6] and [5],
the fundamental limits of covert communications over additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels were first studied. They show that O(
√
n) bits in n channel
uses of a discrete-time channel can be transmitted covertly and reliably. This is
related to steganography, which is the practice of concealing a message within an-
other message. Finite-alphabet steganographic systems have a similar square root
law: at most O(
√
n) symbols in a length n covertext may safely be modified to hide
a length O(
√
n log n)-bit message [12]. The extra log n factor is due to the lack of
noise in the steganographic context. Successive work has extended the results of [6]
and [5] to binary symmetric channels (BSCs) [13, 14] and discrete memoryless chan-
nels (DMCs) [15,16]. The work in [16]- [19] also established the constants behind the
Big-O notation for both DMC and AWGN channels.
Since Willie detects the presence of Alice by detecting deviations from the back-
ground noise environment, uncertainty about that environment will make it harder
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for Willie to determine if Alice is transmitting. Thus, when Willie is uncertain about
the statistical characterization of the Alice-to-Willie channel, Alice can transmit O(n)
bits in n channel uses reliably and covertly [7]- [23]. To remove the restrictions on
Willie, [9] and [11] introduce an uninformed jammer to assist the communication by
actively generating jamming signals. This might be an electronic jammer placed by
Alice and Bob to enhance security, or a jammer placed by an adversary that tries to
jam potential communication from Alice.
The aforementioned works focus on obtaining the scaling limits of reliable covert
communication as a function of the blocklength n. The authors in [24] take a different
approach and consider an infinite blocklength; they then ask what is the probability
that channel conditions are such that a communication is reliable and/or covert. We
term this an “outage” approach [25]- [27]. This approach often captures the salient
aspects of the problem and can clearly illustrate the underlying mechanisms. We
adopt such an approach, which allows Willie to have a perfect estimate of the power
at his receiver. Next, we consider how such an outage formulation impacts the design
of reliable communication between Alice and Bob. Since the variation on the Alice-
to-Bob channel can significantly affect the outage probability, if this current channel
gain is known to Alice then Alice can adapt her power to minimize outage under a
covertness constraint. This motivates the derivation of an optimal power adaptation
scheme.
Adapting power to enhance performance in wireless communications has long been
studied. The authors in [38] prove that the optimal power adaptation to maximize
channel capacity under an average power constraint is “water-pouring”. To simplify
designs, they also consider two suboptimal adaptation schemes: channel inversion
and truncated channel inversion (TCI), which adapt the transmit power but keep
the transmission rate constant. The standard channel inversion scheme is simple to
implement but can exhibit a large capacity penalty in extreme fading environments.
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TCI, on the other hand, only compensates for fading above a certain cutoff point,
and hence avoids the capacity penalty when the channel is bad. This technique has
been employed in many non-covert systems to minimize outage or to achieve good
throughput under an outage constraint, such as in cellular uplink transmission [39],
in cognitive radio broadcasting [40] and in hybrid free-space optical/radio-frequency
transmission [41]. It can also be employed in covert communication systems to as-
sist Alice in achieving reliable and covert transmission. In [24], the authors consider
channel inversion power adaptation at the transmitter to achieve reliable covert com-
munication, where Alice varies her transmit power based on the channel from herself
to Bob in order to keep the received signal power at Bob a constant. The authors
examine the performance in terms of the achieved effective covert throughput and
show that TCI outperforms the standard channel inversion. However, [24] does not
establish the optimality of the scheme, and the parameters of the scheme need to be
obtained numerically. Here, we show that TCI is optimal in certain scenarios and
provide exact optimal schemes that may or may not be TCI in different scenarios.
In this chapter, we consider a covert communication system consisting of a trans-
mitter Alice, a legitimate receiver Bob, a warden Willie and an uninformed jammer
that is not coordinated with Alice. The jammer actively sends jamming signals that
interfere with reception at both Willie and Bob. With the information about the
gain on the channel between Alice and Bob, Alice can adapt her transmit power to
this gain to achieve a certain rate and meet the requirement on covertness such that
Willie detects the presence of the transmission with low probability. We seek to find
the optimal power adaptation that minimizes the average outage probability subject
to the covertness constraint. We consider the following scenarios: 1) the jammer-to-
Willie channel is AWGN; and 2) the jammer-to-Willie channel experiences Rayleigh
fading.
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We present the system model and metrics in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 considers
the scenario when the jammer-to-Willie channel is AWGN, and Section 2.4 proves
similar results in the scenario when there is a fading channel between the jammer and
Willie. Both sections provide the optimal power adaptation in two cases: 1) long-term
adaptation with an average covertness constraint; and 2) short-term adaptation with
an instantaneous covertness constraint. Numerical results that examine and compare
the performance of different power adaptation schemes are also presented. Finally,
Section 2.5 draws the conclusions.
2.2 System Model and Metrics
2.2.1 System Model
Consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2.1 where Alice wants to transmit a message to
Bob reliably and covertly without detection by a warden Willie, and a jammer assists
the communication by actively sending jamming signals but without any coordination
with Alice [9, 11]. We are interested in Alice’s ability to transmit covertly in a time
Figure 2.1: System model: With help from a jammer, Alice attempts to transmit
reliably and covertly to Bob in the presence of a warden Willie.
slot equal to the codeword length n and Willie’s ability to detect such a transmission
in that slot. If Alice decides to transmit, she maps her message to the complex
symbol sequence f = [f1, f2, . . . , fn]. We assume that Alice transmits each symbol
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of a codeword with an average power Pa. The jammer transmits complex symbol
sequence g = [g1, g2, . . . , gn] with power Pj in the time slot, where Pj will be drawn
randomly as discussed below.
We denote hxy as the fading coefficient between transmitter x and receiver y,
where x is either “a” (Alice) or “j” (jammer), and y is either “w” (Willie) or “b”
(Bob). We assume that the fading processes do not change during one time slot
and that those affecting different transmitter-receiver pairs are independent of one
another. The path loss between transmitter x and receiver y is denoted as dαxy, where
α is the path loss exponent.
Denote the vector of channel outputs observed at Willie over the time slot as
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n ] is a set of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, each with variance σ2w. Similarly,
denote the vector of channel outputs observed at Bob over the time slot as y =





















2 , . . . , N
(b)
n ] is a set of i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random vari-
ables, each with variance σ2b . Without loss of generality, we let the path loss d
α/2
xy
(from each transmitter x to receiver y) to be one for our proofs to make the exposi-
tion cleaner. The results obviously extend to cases with different path losses, and we
will present numerical results for the general case.
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We assume that Alice has channel state information (CSI) about the channel hab
from herself to Bob. For example, Bob might be allowed to transmit and thus can
send a pilot signal or could send it covertly to Alice so that Alice could measure
the channel condition. Since Alice learns the channel, she uses a transmit power Pa
that adapts to the channel variation (i.e., as a function of |hab|2). We are interested
in finding the optimal function Pa(|hab|2) under the constraints and metrics defined
in the next two sections. Normally, it is hard for Willie to know hab, since Willie
is in a different location with different reflections. However, hab is not completely
unknown to Willie. For example, Willie might be close to Alice or there could be
high channel correlations between Alice’s and the adversary’s channel even for large
spatial separations, resulting in some leakage to Willie about hab [42,43]. Willie could
also estimate hab by making a detailed record of the physical environment and the
location of Alice and Bob, and then applying a ray-tracing algorithm [44]. Since we
want to be pessimistic, we assume conservatively here that Willie knows hab. We also
assume that he knows the function Pa. Thus, Willie knows Pa(|hab|2).
We study power adaptation under two channel models: 1) AWGN model and 2)
Rayleigh fading model. In the AWGN model, we assume that the Alice-to-Willie,
jammer-to-Willie and jammer-to-Bob channels are all AWGN channels, i.e., haw =
hjw = hjb = 1. The only fading channel in the system is the Alice-to-Bob channel
which experiences Rayleigh fading with E[|hab|2] = 1 for simplicity. The jammer’s
power Pj is assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e., Pj ∼ U [0, PJ ], per [9]. In the
Rayleigh fading model, both the Alice-to-Bob and the jammer-to-Willie channels are
Rayleigh fading channels with E[|hab|2] = E[|hjw|2] = 1. The other channels are
AWGN channels, i.e., haw = hjb = 1 which is pessimistic for Alice. In this Rayleigh
fading case, the jammer is assumed to employ a constant power Pj = PJ since the
channel randomizes the power received at Willie from the jammer [9].
19
In this work, we use an outage approach where we assume that the blocklength
n is sufficiently large that Willie has an accurate power measurement at his receiver.
This approach has been used in recent work (e.g. [24]- [27]) to provide a clear way to
understand the underlying mechanisms of the problems.
2.2.2 Receivers and Performance Metrics
1) Willie: Based on his observations over the time slot, Willie attempts to deter-
mine whether Alice transmitted or not. We define the null hypothesis (H0) as that
Alice did not transmit during the time slot and the alternative hypothesis (H1) as
that Alice transmitted a message. The optimal test for Willie to minimize the error




where fPw(z|H1) and fPw(z|H0) are the probability density functions of Willie’s re-
ceived power Pw when H1 is true and when H0 is true, respectively. It is straight-
forward to show that under both the AWGN model and the Rayleigh fading model,
Λ(z) is non-decreasing as z increases. Thus, the LRT is equivalent to a threshold test
on the received power. Willie’s received power Pw given H0 is true and H1 is true
are, respectively:
• H0: Pw = |hjw|2Pj + σ2w;
• H1: Pw = |haw|2Pa + |hjw|2Pj + σ2w.
Willie’s detector compares Pw to a threshold σ
2






Define P (H0) = 1−p as the probability that Alice did not transmit and P (H1) = p
as the probability that Alice transmitted in the time slot, where we assume that p is
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known to Willie. Willie tries to minimize his probability of error Pe,w = (1−p)PFA +
pPMD, where PFA and PMD are the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection
at Willie, respectively. Since Pe,w ≥ min(p, 1− p)(PFA + PMD) [5], we say that Alice
achieves covert communication if, for a given ε > 0, PFA + PMD ≥ 1− ε [5].
2) Bob: Bob should be able to reliably decode Alice’s message. This is charac-
terized by the probability 1 − Pout,b where Pout,b is the outage probability at Bob,
i.e., the probability that Bob’s received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is below a certain
threshold. We will seek to minimize the value of Pout,b under power and covertness
constraints.
2.2.3 Constraints
Alice wants to use as much power as possible to minimize outage, but she is
bounded by average power and covertness constraints.
The average power constraint is given by:
E|hab|2 [Pa(|hab|
2)] ≤ PA (2.1)
where PA is a constant power budget.
We also have an average covertness constraint, i.e., for a given ε1 > 0,
E|hab|2 [PFA(Pa(|hab|
2)) + PMD(Pa(|hab|2))] ≥ 1− ε1. (2.2)
Some of our results will consider only the average covertness constraint, where the
averaging is done over the channels that Alice will encounter on the Alice-to-Bob
link. However, this constraint might be problematic operationally, as it can result
in Alice sometimes sending messages knowing that she will be detected by Willie
with certainty, with the idea that, since she will not be caught at other times, the
long-term average of her covertness meets the constraint. Since this might not be
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desirable, as Alice might want every message to be covert with some probability, we
also consider cases where an instantaneous covertness constraint has been added: for
a given ε2 > 0,
PFA(Pa(|hab|2)) + PMD(Pa(|hab|2)) ≥ 1− ε2 (2.3)
for all |hab|2.
2.3 AWGN Model
In this section, we consider the AWGN model, where recall that the Alice-to-
Willie, jammer-to-Willie and jammer-to-Bob channels are all AWGN channels, i.e.,
haw = hjw = hjb = 1, and the Alice-to-Bob channel is assumed to be a Rayleigh
fading channel with E[|hab|2] = 1. We prove an optimal power adaptation scheme for
two cases: under the average covertness constraint, and under both the average and
the instantaneous covertness constraints.
2.3.1 Average Covertness Constraint
We first consider a power adaptation scheme that minimizes the outage probability
at Bob and achieves covertness on average as given in (2.1). For Bob to reliably decode
Alice’s message, the received SNR at Bob needs to be above a threshold γb. Given a







where, per Section 2.2, |hab|
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is random because of the randomly chosen jam-

























does not decrease the outage prob-
ability but increases Alice’s transmitted power, leading uniformly not only to wasted
power but a loss in covertness, we add the constraint:






Taking the expectation of Pout,b(Pa(|hab|2)) over |hab|2 yields:
E|hab|2 [Pout,b(Pa(|hab|










Given that |hab|2 is exponentially distributed with E[|hab|2] = 1, the average power




−xdx ≤ PA. (2.5)
The false alarm probability at Willie given Pa(|hab|2) is given by:
PFA(Pa(|hab|2)) = P (Pw > σ2w + τ |H0)





, τ < PJ
0, τ ≥ PJ ,
and the missed detection probability at Willie is given by:
PMD(Pa(|hab|2)) = P (Pw < σ2w + τ |H1)





, τ > Pa(|hab|2)
0, τ ≤ Pa(|hab|2).
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Willie picks a threshold τ that minimizes his error probability Pe,w. If Pa(|hab|2) ≥
PJ , then Willie can choose τ such that PJ ≤ τ ≤ Pa(|hab|2) and achieves PFA(Pa(|hab|2))+





, PJ > Pa(|hab|2)
0, PJ ≤ Pa(|hab|2).
(2.6)
Recall that the Alice-to-Bob channel is Rayleigh fading with E[|hab|2] = 1. Thus,
|hab|2 is exponentially distributed and taking the expectation of PFA(Pa(|hab|2)) +
PMD(Pa(|hab|2)) over |hab|2 yields:
E|hab|2 [PFA(Pa(|hab|



















−xdx ≤ ε1 (2.8)
for a given ε1 > 0.
We are interested in looking for an optimal Pa(|hab|2) such that the outage prob-
ability at Bob is minimized under the constraints in (2.8), (2.5) and (2.4). Therefore,


























The following lemma provides a valuable tool for the succeeding optimizations.
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f(x)e−xdx ≤ C0 and 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ g(x)
where C0 is a constant. If
∫∞
0
g(x)e−xdx > C0, the optimal solution is:
f ∗(x) =
 g(x), x ≥ ∆0, 0 ≤ x < ∆ (2.10)
where ∆ > 0 is such that
∫∞
∆
g(x)e−xdx = C0. Otherwise,
f ∗(x) = g(x) , x ≥ 0. (2.11)
Proof. We prove the optimal solution by showing that any f(x) in the constraint
set other than f ∗(x) will not increase the objective function. For a given candidate
function f(x), we write f(x) = f ∗(x) + u(x). If f(x) is in the constraint set, then we
must have three conditions: (a)
∫∞
0
u(x)e−xdx ≤ 0 since f ∗(x) already has achieved
equality in the first constraint; (b) u(x) ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ x < ∆ since f(x) ≥ 0; and


































xf ∗(x)e−xdx. When f ∗(x) is given in

















solution is given by:






, x ≥ δ
0, 0 ≤ x < δ
(2.14)
































e−xdx = PJε1, otherwise.
(2.15)
Proof. The proof makes use of Lemma 2.1 and is provided in detail in the appendix
in Section 2.6.1.
From Theorem 2.1, we conclude that the optimal power adaptation under the aver-
age covertness constraint when the jammer-to-Willie channel is AWGN is truncated
channel inversion, i.e., transmitting power as the inverse of the channel condition
when the channel is good; and transmitting nothing when the channel is bad. Alice
transmits with power that inverts the channel variation when the channel condition
is good, and does not transmit when the channel condition is bad to save power and
to avoid detection by Willie. The constant (γb(σ
2
b + PJ) in this case) of the inversion
scheme is analytically provided and the cutoff point (δ in this case) can be directly
computed based on the system parameters.
We notice that if δ < η, Alice is allowed to use power greater than PJ . This
will lead to an error probability of zero at Willie according to (5.1), which means
26
that Willie will detect Alice’s transmission for certain. However, although Alice is
completely exposed to Willie for channel conditions such that δ < |hab|2 < η, she still
achieves covertness on average. We add the extra instantaneous covertness constraint
that requires Alice to achieve a certain covertness for any channel condition in the
next section.
2.3.2 Instantaneous Covertness Constraint
Now we consider a power adaptation scheme that minimizes the outage probability
at Bob and achieves covertness both on average and instantaneously. Recall that the
instantaneous covertness constraint is given in (2.3). Applying (2.6) to (2.3) we have
for a given ε2 > 0,
Pa(|hab|2) ≤ PJε2,
which is equivalent to a peak power constraint.
Since Pa(|hab|2) is bounded by PJε2, we modify (5.1) in this case as:









for a given ε1 > 0. This is equivalent to an average power constraint. Thus, the
smaller of PJε1 and the power budget PA determines the upper bound on the average
power.
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The average outage probability is the same and we still have the constraint in











−xdx ≤ min(PJε1, PA),

















Note that this problem is different from that encountered in standard (non-covert)
communication systems: 1) with an average power constraint [38] where the optimal
solution that maximizes the average capacity is “water-pouring” and the truncated
channel inversion scheme is suboptimal as it only achieves a certain outage capacity;
2) with an extra peak power constraint [45]. Here we use a different metric (average
outage probability), and our system employs a jammer that interferes with reception



























−xdx ≥ min(PJε1, PA),
the optimal solution to the above optimization problem is given by:
P ∗a (x) =
 Ba(x), x ≥ β0, 0 ≤ x < β,
and otherwise,
P ∗a (x) = Ba(x) , x ≥ 0.
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−xdx ≥ min(PJε1, PA).
From Theorem 2.2 we see that the optimal power adaptation scheme is determined





, then the optimal adaptation scheme is truncated
channel inversion. Otherwise, the power is limited by a constant for certain channel
conditions due to the instantaneous covertness constraint.
29
(a) AWGN case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the path loss
dαab between Alice and Bob.
(b) AWGN case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the path loss
dαjw between the jammer and Willie.
Figure 2.2: Average outage probability in the case under the extra instantaneous
covertness constraint when Alice employs optimal power adaptation, TCI, and trun-
cated constant power.
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Figure 2.3: Power allocations for the optimal scheme, TCI and the truncated constant
scheme.
Figure 2.2 presents the numerical results that examine the performance improve-
ment of the optimal scheme in Theorem 2.2 over TCI and truncated constant power.
The parameters in TCI and truncated constant power are obtained by numerical
search such that the average outage probability is minimized. We set PA = 1, PJ = 5,
ε1 = 0.1, ε2 = 0.2, γb = 2, σ
2
b = 2, and the path loss between each transmitter and re-
ceiver is one if not specified. The exact power allocations for the three schemes given
the above parameters with dαab = 0.2 are shown in Figure 2.3. From both Fig. 2.2a
and Fig. 2.2b, we see that there are often significant gains in achieving reliable covert
communication when employing optimal power adaptation. In Fig. 2.2a, we observe
that the performance of the optimal scheme and that of the constant power scheme
approach each other when dαab increases. This is due to the fact that the instantaneous
covertness constraint limits Alice’s power to a constant for channel conditions that
are likely to occur, and Alice uses channel inversion only for channel conditions that
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rarely occur for large dαab. Mathematically, when d
α
ab increases, the channel conditions





from Theorem 2.2) and occupies more of the probabilities.
2.4 Rayleigh Fading Model
In this section, we consider the Rayleigh fading model, where both the Alice-to-
Bob and the jammer-to-Willie channels are Rayleigh fading channels with E[|hab|2] =
E[|hjw|2] = 1. The other channels are AWGN channels, i.e., haw = hjb = 1. We
assume conservatively that Bob is not able to cancel the jamming signal at his receiver.
We prove an optimal power adaptation scheme under both the average covertness
constraint and with the extra instantaneous covertness constraint.
2.4.1 Average Covertness Constraint
Given Pa(|hab|2), the outage probability at Bob is:
Pout,b(Pa(|hab|2)) =
 1, |hab|
2Pa(|hab|2) < γb (σ2b + PJ)
0, |hab|2Pa(|hab|2) ≥ γb (σ2b + PJ) .
Since letting Pa(|hab|2) >
γb(σ2b+PJ)
|hab|2
or letting Pa(|hab|2) > 0 for Pa(|hab|2) <
γb(σ2b+PJ)
|hab|2
does not change the outage probability but increases Alice’s power, Pa(|hab|2) should
always take a value of either zero or
γb(σ2b+PJ)
|hab|2
. Thus, taking the expectation over


















 1, x ∈ A0, x /∈ A is the indicator function of set A.
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and the probability of missed detection:
PMD(Pa(|hab|2)) = P
(






PJ , τ > Pa(|hab|2)
0, τ ≤ Pa(|hab|2).
Recall that we assume conservatively here that Willie knows Pa(|hab|2). Then, to
minimize his error probability, Willie will choose a threshold τ = Pa(|hab|2). Thus,
we have:




and taking the expectation over |hab|2 yields:
E|hab|2 [PFA(Pa(|hab|











PJ e−xdx ≥ 1− ε1
for a given ε1 > 0.
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PJ e−xdx ≥ 1− ε1,∫ ∞
0
Pa(x)e
−xdx ≤ PA. (2.19)
Since we focus on reasonable power schemes that could be implemented in practice,
we only consider power control strategies that employ a finite collection of intervals.
Therefore, the theorem below is obtained by assuming that the optimal strategy does
not include singletons or an infinite number of intervals. In other words, recalling



















, x ∈ [a1, b1) ∪ . . . ∪ [an, bn)
0, else
(2.20)
where n ∈ Z+ and an, bn ∈ R+.
Theorem 2.3. Given the structure in (2.20) of the potential strategies, the optimal
solution to the problem in (2.19) is given by:






, x > µ
0, x ≤ µ









xPJ e−xdx = 1− ε1 and







Proof. Suppose that there is a better solution than P ∗a (x) given in the theorem state-
ment. Denote that solution by (2.20), where 0 ≤ a1 < µ, bn ≤ ∞, and an > bn−1 if
n > 1. Pa(x) must satisfy both the average covertness and power constraints. On the
other hand, P ∗a (x) also satisfies the two constraints and achieves equality in at least
one of the constraints by construction. Suppose that P ∗a (x) achieves equality in the

















However, in Appendix B, we show that in satisfying (2.21), the objective function in
(2.19) cannot get larger, and hence, Pa(x) is not optimal.









for a given ε1 > 0. Suppose that P
∗
a (x) achieves equality in the average covertness























Then, following a similar argument (details provided in the appendix in Section 2.6.2)
when equality in the average power constraint is achieved by P ∗a (x), we can show
that for Pa(x) to satisfy (2.22), the objective function in (2.19) will not get larger.
Therefore, Pa(x) is not optimal in any case, which completes the proof.
We conclude from Theorem 2.3 that in the case when the jammer-to-Willie channel
is faded and we are operating under the average covertness constraint, the optimal
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power adaptation is truncated channel inversion. Again, the constant of the scheme
is analytically provided and the cutoff point can be directly computed based on the
system parameters.
2.4.2 Instantaneous Covertness Constraint
Now we consider the case that we also have the instantaneous covertness constraint
(2.3) which bounds (2.17) by 1− ε2:
Pa(|hab|2) ≤ PJ ln
1
1− ε2



























































PJ e−xdx = 1 − ε1









PJ e−xdx ≤ 1 − ε1 or∫∞
0
Qa(x)e
−xdx ≥ PA, the optimal solution is given by:
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P ∗a (x) =
 Qa(x), x > λ0, 0 ≤ x ≤ λ,
and otherwise,
P ∗a (x) = Qa(x) , x ≥ 0.
From Theorem 2.4 we conclude that the optimal power adaptation in the case that
the jammer-to-Willie channel is faded and under the extra instantaneous covertness







. Otherwise, the power is limited by a constant for
certain channel conditions due to the instantaneous covertness constraint.
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(a) Rayleigh fading case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the
path loss dαab between Alice and Bob.
(b) Rayleigh fading case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the
path loss dαjw between the jammer and Willie.
Figure 2.4: Average outage probability under both the average and the instantaneous
covertness constraints when Alice employs optimal power adaptation, TCI, and trun-
cated constant power The jammer employs constant power.
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(a) Rayleigh fading case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the
path loss dαab between Alice and Bob.
(b) Rayleigh fading case: Average outage probability Pout in terms of the
path loss dαjw between the jammer and Willie.
Figure 2.5: Average outage probability under both the average and the instantaneous
covertness constraints when Alice employs optimal power adaptation, TCI, and trun-
cated constant power the jammer employs uniformly distributed power.
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Figure 2.4 presents the numerical results that examine the performance of the
optimal scheme in Theorem 2.4 and that of TCI and truncated constant power. The
parameters in TCI and truncated constant power are obtained by numerical search
such that the average outage probability of the scheme is minimized. We set PA = 1,
PJ = 5, ε1 = 0.1, ε2 = 0.2, γb = 2, σ
2
b = 2 and the pathloss between each transmitter
and receiver as one if not specified. The jammer’s power is set to be a constant. We see
from both Fig. 2.4a and Fig. 2.4b that, unlike the AWGN case, the optimal schemes
do not have a significant performance gain over TCI. Note that this is for the case
when the jammer’s power is set to be a constant as suggested in [9], since the Rayleigh
fading channel randomizes the jammer’s power and hence makes it unknown at Willie.
However, it is very unlikely that the jammer power would be set to a constant in
practice, because such a setting would be fragile: the nature of the potential operating
environment is generally uncertain and, if the environment encountered were AWGN
rather than Rayleigh fading, Willie would know the jamming plus noise power exactly
when Alice is not transmitting and covertness would be lost for any positive rate [5].
Therefore, it is of interest to consider a random power at the jammer in the Rayleigh
fading case. If the jammer employs a uniformly distributed power and we adopt the
optimal power adaptation scheme from Theorem 2.4, we can observe from Fig. 2.5
that the optimal scheme significantly outperforms TCI and the truncated constant
power scheme.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered covert communication with help from an
uninformed jammer. We have taken an outage approach that considers an infinite
blocklength, which allows Willie to have an accurate estimate of his received power,
and established optimal power adaptation schemes in different scenarios. We proved
that in the case of an AWGN channel or a Rayleigh fading channel between the
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jammer and Willie, the optimal scheme under the average covertness constraint is
truncated channel inversion. Under both the average and the instantaneous covertness
constraint, TCI is not optimal, and we have provided exact optimal power adaptation
schemes. These schemes outperform standard approaches such as TCI by reducing
the average outage probability significantly in many scenarios.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Here we privide the detailed proof of Theorem 2.1. Let us denote the first con-
straint (average covertness constraint) in (2.9) as CSTR1, the second constraint (av-
erage power constraint) in (2.9) as CSTR2 and the last constraint in (2.9) as CSTR3.
We first remove CSTR1 while keep CSTR2 and CSTR3 in the optimization problem.








is satisfied. By Lemma 2.1, the optimal solution can be obtained as in (2.14) with
δ = ∆1. Next, we remove CSTR2 but keep CSTR1 and CSTR3. We show in the
appendix that the optimal solution can also be obtained as in (2.14) using similar
ideas in the proof of Lemma 2.1.
From the discussion above, we see that if ∆1 ≥ ∆2, then the optimal solution that
satisfies the two constraints CSTR2 and CSTR3 also satisfies all three constraints and
hence is optimal when all three constraints are enforced; when ∆1 < ∆2, the optimal
solution that satisfies CSTR1 and CSTR3 also satisfies all three constraints and hence
is optimal under all three constraints. Moreover, since we pick δ = max(∆1,∆2) and







for all x > 0 (having δ = 0).
Therefore, the optimal solution under the three constraints in (2.9) is obtained as in
(2.14) with the cutoff point δ determined by either ∆1 or ∆2, i.e., δ = max(∆1,∆2).
Now we show why (2.14) is the optimal solution to the problem in (2.9) with










= xe−x , x ≥ 0.
This cannot equal zero, which shows that there are no stationary points. Thus, if
there exists an optimal solution, it should be on the boundary of the set determined
by the constraints. From the third constraint, we note that the optimal Pa(x) must





for all x ≥ 0 to lie on the boundary of the constraint set.



















e−xdx ≤ PJε1, then ∆2 ≤ η. For a given function
Pa(x) other than P
∗
a (x), we write Pa(x) = P
∗
a (x) + u(x). If Pa(x) is in the constraint















≥ PJ when x ≤ η):




for 0 ≤ x < ∆2 since Pa(x) ≥ 0;



































0 in order for Pa(x) to satisfy the average covertness constraint since the equality
is already reached for P ∗a (x). Here, IA(x) =
 1, x ∈ A0, x /∈ A is the indicator






































































where (2.24) is obtained from condition (a) and (b), (2.25) is obtained from condition













e−xdx > PJε1; then, ∆2 > η. Similarly, we can show that∫∞
0















u(x)e−xdx ≤ 0 and prove accordingly.












e−xdx = ε1 ,





for all x > 0. In this case, we know




for all x > 0 for Pa(x) to stay in the constraint set.
Then, it is clear that
∫∞
0
xu(x)e−xdx ≤ 0, which shows the optimality of P ∗a (x). This
is equivalent to having ∆2 = 0 in (2.14).
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Here we prove that the power function Pa(x) given in (2.20) is not optimal since


















































































































































































Now, supposing that bm ≤ µ < am+1 and 1 ≤ m < n when bn > µ, the proof

































































































































Note that when bn =∞ (n must be larger than one since a1 < µ), we can subtract
the integration from an to bn on both sides of (2.21) and then prove that (2.27) is
true for both bn−1 ≤ µ and bn−1 > µ using the same argument as above.
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CHAPTER 3
COVERT COMMUNICATIONS ON A
CONTINUOUS-TIME MODEL WITH AN UNINFORMED
JAMMER
3.1 Introduction
Security is a major concern in modern wireless communications, where it is often
obtained by encryption. However, this is not sufficient in applications where the very
existence of transmission arouses suspicion. For example, in military communications,
the detection of a transmission may reveal activity in the region. Thus, it is important
to study covert communication: a transmitter (Alice) reliably sending messages to
a legitimate receiver (Bob) without being detected by an attentive warden (Willie).
Previous work studied the limits of reliable covert communications. Bash et al. first
studied such limits over discrete-time AWGN channels in [5], establishing a square-
root law (SRL): Alice can transmit at most O(
√
n) covert bits to Bob in n channel
uses of a discrete-time AWGN channel. This SRL was then established in successive
work over binary symmetric channels (BSCs) by Che et al. in [13], over discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs) by Wang et al., [16] and Bloch, [19], and over multiple-
access channels [47] by Arumugam et al.. The length of the secret key needed to
achieve the SRL in covert communications over DMCs was established in [19]. The
work in [16] and [19] also established scaling constants for the covert throughput.
These works provide a thorough study of covert communications in common discrete-
time channel models when Willie has an accurate statistical characterization of Alice’s
channel to him.
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Recently, covert communication has been further studied in various applications
such as the Internet of Things (IoT) [48]- [50], relay and ad-hoc networks [51]- [55],
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks [56, 57], and D2D underlaying cellular
networks [58, 59]. In particular, in IoT networks, covert communication technology
is emerging as a crucial security technique, since it hides the very existence of the
transmission and hence prevents the detection of the IoT users’ presence. For example,
it can allow patients to privately wear medical devices unknown to others in public
places. Hence, the study of the theory and application of covert communication is
well-motivated.
In covert communications, Willie attempts to determine whether he is only ob-
serving the background environment or a signal from Alice in that environment.
Hence, uncertainty about the environment helps Alice to hide her transmission. Lee
et al., [23] and Che et al., [14] show that O(n) covert bits in n channel uses can be
reliably transmitted from Alice to Bob if Willie is unsure of the variance of the noise
at his receiver. However, Goeckel et al., [37] shows that Willie’s lack of knowledge
of his noise statistics can be compensated for by estimation through a collection of
channel observations when Alice does not transmit. Thus, the limit of covert commu-
nications in this case reverts to the SRL. Sobers et al., [9], introduced another model
to achieve positive covert rate: introducing an uninformed jammer to the system that
randomly generates interference, hence providing the required uncertainty for Willie.
The work of [9] also established the optimality for Willie of a power detector in the
presence of the uninformed jammer in the discrete-time model. It then shows that
Alice can covertly transmit O(n) bits in n channel uses over both AWGN and block
fading channels when Willie uses the optimal detector.
The works mentioned above are all based on a discrete-time model and thus implic-
itly assume that analogous results can be obtained on the corresponding continuous-
time model. Bash et al. first mentioned the potential fragility of such an assump-
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tion [5]: ideal sinc(·) pulse shapes are not feasible for implementation, perfect symbol
synchronization might not always hold true, and sampling at higher rates sometimes
has utility for signal detection at Willie even if the Nyquist intersymbol interfer-
ence (Nyquist ISI) criterion is satisfied. Considering covert communications in a
continuous-time model, Wang in [60, 61] shows that covert channel capacity is posi-
tive over an AWGN channel when there is no bandwidth constraint. Wang [62] also
shows that the covert channel capacity is infinite over a continuous-time, infinite-
bandwidth Poisson channel. Zhang et al. in [63] consider a similar problem as in [60],
but under a spectral mask constraint. They show that without any jamming, despite
the fragilities mentioned in [5], the converted discrete-time signal forms a sufficient
statistic for Willie to perform detection, and hence, it suffices to apply standard
techniques for discrete-time models to the continuous-time model. In particular, they
prove that given a time T and a spectral mask with bandwidth W , Alice can transmit
O(
√
WT ) information bits covertly and reliably to Bob.
However, the above works only study the standard Alice-Bob-Willie scenario, and
the suitability of a discrete-time model has not been considered in the important case
where an uninformed jammer is present to assist Alice. In fact, we will show later that
this study leads to very different conclusions than the case without a jammer. In [11],
Sobers et al. introduced a linear detector for warden Willie that exploits the difference
in the timing offsets of Alice’s and the jammer’s signals. This detector outperforms the
standard power detector implemented in the continuous-time system in some limited
scenarios. Therefore, a major tenet of [9] that facilitated the establishment of positive
rate covert communications in the discrete-time case does not hold in the continuous-
time case. Rather, Willie’s detection capability benefits from the continuous-time
setting, hence raising questions on the covert limits in true continuous-time chan-
nels in the case with a jammer. For general scenarios, we introduce an interference
cancellation detector in Section 3.3 inspired by co-channel interference cancellation
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techniques in cellular networks [70], and show that this detector outperforms the stan-
dard power detector implemented in continuous-time covert communication systems.
Traditional co-channel interference cancellation requires that the receiver be able to
decode the entire stream of data hidden behind the interference. However, in covert
communication, Willie only needs to detect the existence of Alice’s transmission, i.e.,
the receiver only needs to resolve a single bit of uncertainty about what is behind the
interference, hence suggesting the difficult challenge of achieving positive rate covert
communication in such an environment.
In this chapter, we will establish constructions for Alice and an uninformed jammer
such that positive covert rate is achievable over continuous-time band-limited AWGN
channels. In contrast to what is observed in [63] for the case without a jammer, the
continuous-time covert communication problem with a jammer is very different than
the discrete-time problem considered in [9]. In particular, the reader will note how
the constructions provided here are quite different from those in [9]. In addition, we
will also consider the case where there is no frame synchronization between Alice and
the jammer, which also extends the work in [9]. The contributions of the work can
be summarized as follows:
• Continuous-Time Covert Communications in the Presence of a Jammer Re-
quires Different Approaches than Discrete-Time: In contrast to [9], we show
that a straightforward implementation of the standard power detector (which is
optimal in the discrete-time setting) in a continuous-time system in the presence
of a jammer is not the optimal detector at Willie. We introduce an interference
cancellation detector for Willie that outperforms the standard power detector.
• Technique for Alice to Achieve Continuous-Time Covert Communication with
Positive Rate in the Presence of a Jammer: For a continuous-time channel with
asymptotic bandwidth W as T → ∞, as defined precisely in Section 3.2, we
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establish a construction for Alice and the jammer such that O(WT ) information
bits can be transmitted covertly and reliably in T seconds.
• No Frame Synchronization Between Alice and the Jammer: The work in [9]
assumes perfect frame synchronization between Alice and the jammer in a
discrete-time system. We argue that the construction in [9] that achieves O(n)
covert bits in n channel uses may not achieve such if there is no frame synchro-
nization. For a continuous-time system, we extend our construction to show
that O(WT ) bits can be transmitted covertly and reliably when there is no
frame synchronization.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides the system
model and metrics. Section 3.3 introduces the interference cancellation detector and
presents a performance analysis that shows Willie’s advantages in a continuous-time
system over a discrete-time system. In Section 3.4, we establish constructions that
enable covert communications when there is perfect frame synchronization between
Alice and the jammer. In particular, for a continuous-time channel with asymptotic
bandwidth W , O(WT ) information bits can be transmitted covertly and reliably
in T seconds. Section 3.5 extends the construction by relaxing the requirement of
frame synchronization between Alice and the jammer. Finally, Section 3.6 draws the
conclusions.
3.2 System Model and Metrics
3.2.1 System Model
Consider the scenario shown in Fig. 3.1 where transmitter Alice (“a”) wants to
transmit a message to intended recipient Bob (“b”) reliably without being detected
by a warden Willie (“w”). A jammer (“j”) assists the communication by actively
sending jamming signals, but without any coordination with Alice.
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Figure 3.1: System model: With help from a jammer, Alice attempts to transmit
reliably and covertly to intended recipient Bob in the presence of a warden Willie.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the time slots, each of length T . Alice may (or may not)
transmit in slot [0, T ], and Willie attempts to detect her presence in that slot.
For an integer C, we consider a continuous-time channel with 2C time slots, each
of length T , as shown in Fig. 3.2. We focus on slot [0, T ]; i.e., Alice may (or may
not) transmit in this slot, and assume the jammer transmits in all time slots, and
does not know if Alice decides to transmit. If Alice decides to transmit, she will use
the slot [0, T ]. Since any signal restricted in a finite time interval cannot have finite
bandwidth, [63] employs a spectral mask that restricts excessive radiation beyond the
bandwidth of interest, resulting in an approximate finite bandwidth. For our work,
with T →∞, we use the following definition of asymptotic bandwidth:
Definition 3.1 (Asymptotic Bandwidth). We say that a signal x(t) with t ∈ [0, T ] has






E [|X(f)|2] df = 0,
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where X(f) is the Fourier transform of x(t), and X(f) depends on T since x(t) is
restricted to [0, T ].
Alice sends message signal xa(t) (if she decides to transmit) that is restricted
to asymptotic bandwidth W under an average power constraint of PA. The jammer
sends interference signal xj(t) that is restricted to asymptotic bandwidth W under an
average power constraint of PJ . The channels between each transmitter and receiver



















where dxy is the distance between a transmitter x and a receiver y, r is the path-loss
exponent, τa and τj are timing offsets of Alice’s and the jammer’s signal, respectively,
and N (w)(t) is the noise observed at Willie’s receiver, which is a zero-mean stationary
Gaussian random process with power spectral density N
(w)
0 /2. Bob observes the
channel output y(t) at time t, which is analogous to z(t) but with the substitution of
the distance dxb for dxw, where transmitter x is either Alice or the jammer, and the
substitution of the noise N (b)(t) for N (w)(t), where N (b)(t) is a zero-mean stationary
Gaussian random process with power spectral density N
(b)
0 /2.
We consider two cases: 1) When there is frame synchronization between Alice’s
and the jammer’s signals; and 2) When there is no frame synchronization. In both
cases, we assume that the path-loss between Alice and Willie is unknown, but there





Based on his observations, Willie attempts to determine whether Alice transmitted
or not. We define the null hypothesis (H0) to be that Alice did not transmit during
the time interval and the alternative hypothesis (H1) to be that Alice transmitted
a message. We denote P (H0) and P (H1) as the probability that hypothesis H0 or
H1 is true, respectively. Willie tries to minimize his probability of error P
(w)
e =
P (H0)PFA+P (H1)PMD, where PFA and PMD are the probabilities of false alarm and
missed detection at Willie, respectively. We assume pessimistically that P (H0) and
P (H1) are known by Willie. Since P
(w)
e ≥ min(P (H0), P (H1))(PFA+PMD) [5], we say
that Alice achieves covert communication if, for a given ε > 0, PFA+PMD ≥ 1− ε [5].
We assume that Willie has full knowledge of the statistical model: the time slot
[0, T ], the parameters for Alice’s codebook generation, the parameters for the jam-
mer’s interference generation, and the noise power of his channel. Willie does not
know the secret key shared between Alice and Bob, or the instantiation of the ran-
dom jamming.
3.2.2.2 Bob
Bob should be able to reliably decode Alice’s message. This is characterized by
the probability 1 − P (b)e where P (b)e is the probability of error at Bob. We say that
Alice achieves reliable communication if, for a given δ > 0, P
(b)
e < δ [5].
3.3 Interference Cancellation Detection by Willie
Here we show that in contrast to [9], a straightforward implementation of the
standard power detector at Willie is not optimal in the continuous-time model. This
means that the achievability result for the covert limit cannot assume a power de-
tector at Willie, and hence, the positive covert rate established in [9] may not hold
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true. The work in [70] introduced a co-channel interference cancellation technique
that exploits the excess bandwidth in any realizable continuous-time system for ini-
tial signal separation when the signals have different timing offsets. We show that
similar techniques can be applied by Willie in continuous-time covert communication
systems and that these techniques outperform the power detector. Different from
traditional co-channel interference cancellation, where the receiver wants to decode
the information in a signal that is mixed with another signal, here Willie only needs
to detect the existence of Alice’s transmission – a single bit decision indicating H0 or
H1. Without loss of generality, we assume that d
r
xy = 1 for all transmitters x (Alice
or the jammer) and receivers y (Willie or Bob). However, this assumption is not
necessary, and is not required to be known by Willie.
3.3.1 Construction
Here we introduce the natural extension of the work in [9] to continuous-time
to demonstrate its limitation. We employ random coding and generate codewords
by independently drawing symbols from a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution
with variance σ2a (σ
2
a ≤ PA). The codebook is shared between Alice and Bob, and
is unknown to Willie. If Alice decides to transmit, she first selects the codeword
corresponding to her message, sets fi to the i
th symbol of that codeword (E[|fi|2] =
σ2a), and transmits the sequence {fi}ni=1, where n is the length of the codeword. The
jammer, with knowledge of the slot boundaries but not whether Alice transmits in
a given slot (or at all), transmits the zero-mean complex Gaussian symbol sequence
{v(ξ)i }ni=1 in time slot [ξT, (ξ+ 1)T ] with variance E[|v
(ξ)
i |2] = σ2j,ξ (σ2j,ξ varies between
slots and σ2j,ξ ≤ PJ), where ξ ∈ {−C,−(C − 1), . . . , C − 1, }.






fip(t− iTs), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where Ts = T/n is the symbol period, and p(t) is a square-root raised cosine (SRRC)
pulse shaping filter with bandwidth (1+β)/2Ts < W , where β is the excess bandwidth








i p(t− ξT − iTs), −CT ≤ t ≤ CT
3.3.2 Willie’s Receiver
Willie employs a matched filter with impulse response p(−t) at the front-end of
his receiver. Define zmf (t) = z(t) ∗ p(−t) as the output of the matched filter, where







i q(t− iTs − τj) +N (w)(t) ∗ p(−t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.2)
where q(t) = p(t) ∗ p(−t) is the zero-ISI raised cosine (RC) pulse. When Alice









i q(t− iTs − τj) +N (w)(t) ∗ p(−t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
(3.3)
We assume that Willie knows the timing offset τj of the jammer’s signal, as he can
accurately estimate it prior to Alice’s transmission [24]. Unlike [11], we do not require
that Willie know Alice’s timing offset τa. Since the power of Alice’s signal is much
smaller than that of the jammer and Alice might transmit just once, obtaining τa
could be challenging for Willie; hence, removing the requirement that τa is available
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at Willie is a significant strength of the converse results of this section. As shown in
Fig. 3.3, Willie first samples the signal at τj + kTs, k = 1, 2, . . . , n at Branch J. This
sampled signal is then used to reconstruct an estimate of the jammer’s signal. Next,
this estimated interference signal is subtracted from the received signal, and Willie
thus obtains an approximation of Alice’s signal as the output, which he can sample
(above Nyquist rate) and then employ a standard power detector.
Figure 3.3: Model of interference cancellation at Willie in a covert communication
system in the presence of a jammer.
Let r(j) denote the vector of samples at Branch J. The kth element of the sample












(w) ∗ p(−kTs − τj) is the sampled noise at Branch J. Willie then






k q(t− kTs − τj) . (3.4)










fiq((k − i)Ts + τj − τa)q(t− kTs − τj)
+N (w)(t) ∗ p(−t)−N (j)k q(t− kTs − τj) (3.5)
which has no components due to the jammer. Rather, since the signal is projected on
the null space of the jammer’s interference, it only experiences a small reduction in
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of Alice’s signal due to noise enhancement, as will be
observed in the simulation results in the next section. This implies that when Willie
employs this interference cancellation detector, adding a jammer will not change the
order of the covert throughput as n→∞. Thus, in contrast to [9], where the authors
prove that O(n) bits in n channel uses can be transmitted reliably and covertly
on a discrete-time channel in the presence of a jammer, the natural extension of
the techniques in [9] to continuous-time channels is not effective in the presence of
interference cancellation detection at Willie. Rather, the covert throughput obeys the
SRL proved in [5] for the case without a jammer. Obviously, the same upper bound
on covert throughput then holds true for an optimal detector at Willie.
58
3.3.3 Simulation
(a) τa = 4 samples
(b) τa = 8 samples
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(c) τa = 12 samples
(d) τa = 16 samples
Figure 3.4: Receiver operating characteristic of the interference cancellation detector
and the standard power detector (implemented in a continuous-time covert commu-
nication system) when the jammer’s SNR is 20, 15 and 10 dB.
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Fig. 3.4 compares the performance of the interference cancellation detector and the
standard power detector implemented at Willie in the continuous-time system. In the
simulation, we set the number of trials to 2000. For each trial, Alice and the jammer
each send 200 independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean Gaussian
symbols with pulse-shaped waveforms using a square-root raised cosine pulse shaping
filter with roll-off factor 0.2. The two signals have symbol period Ts = 48 discrete-
time samples. Alice has a timing offset τa of 4, 8, 12 and 16 discrete-time samples,
respectively, and the jammer has a timing offset of zero. Alice’s SNR is set to 5 dB,
and the jammer’s SNR is set to 20, 15, and 10 dB. For the interference cancellation
detector, a standard power detector is applied after interference cancellation to detect
Alice’s presence. The standard power detector employs a sample rate of 2/Ts.
From Fig. 3.4, we observe that the performance of the interference cancellation
detector does not change with respect to the jammer’s SNR, as expected, since the
jammer’s signal is canceled. When τa = 4, the difference between the timing offsets of
Alice’s and the jammer’s signals |τa − τj| = Ts/12 is small. As shown in Fig. 3.4 (a),
when the jammer’s SNR is relatively low (10 and 15 dB), the interference cancellation
detector does not perform as well as the standard power detector implemented in
the continuous-time system due to the significant noise enhancement in this case.
Note that the noise enhancement is independent of n, so even in this case (small
|τa − τj|), the interference cancellation detector at Willie would limit the order of
the covert throughput that Alice could achieve. When τa is large enough (τa = 8, 10
or 12 samples), the interference cancellation detector significantly outperforms the
standard power detector. This shows that while Alice can reliably transmit O(n)
bits in n channel uses when the standard power detector is employed at Willie, she
can only transmit O(
√
n) bits if Willie employs the interference cancellation detector
since the interference cancellation detector completely cancels out the jammer’s signal
with only a reduction to the SNR that is independent of n. Hence, it is important
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for us to analyze covert communications using a continuous-time model to establish
achievability results for the covert communications. In the next two sections, we will
show that positive rate covert communications can be achieved in continuous-time
systems, using a very different construction than that employed in [9].
3.4 Achievable Covert Communications: Perfect Frame Syn-
chronization between Alice and the Jammer
In this section, we provide a construction for Alice and the jammer in the case
that they both agree (or know) on the codeword slot timing, as is plausible because
Alice could listen before transmitting to obtain such. A challenge to hiding Alice’s
transmission in the jammer’s interference will be that Alice and the jammer will
have different and unknown pathloss draw and d
r
jw, respectively, to Willie. Hence,
without loss of generality, we assume drxy = 1 for all transmitter and receiver pairs
(x, y), but that draw may not. The construction consists of Alice and the jammer
sending randomly located pulses, and hence, Willie will not be able to detect the
presence of Alice by exploiting the difference between the timing offsets of Alice and
the jammer’s signals, as was done in Section 3.3. Also, to thwart Willie detecting the
presence of Alice by looking for a pulse power distribution that is the combination of
two distributions, we have the jammer send pulses at multiple power levels that cover
a wide range of the power spectrum. Thus, if Alice uses an average power resulting in
the pulses arriving at Willie with power within that range, she can hide herself in the
jammer’s interference. We demonstrate that, under this construction, the number of
power levels Willie observes is a sufficient statistic for a genie-aided Willie to detect
Alice’s presence. The ability for Alice to covertly send O(WT ) bits in [0, T ] is then
established against an optimal genie-aided Willie, which guarantees the achievability
against the optimal true Willie. This shows that positive rate covert communications
can be achieved in a continuous-time systems when aided by a jammer:
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Theorem 3.1. Given the system model in Section 3.2 with frame synchronization
between Alice and the jammer, there exists a construction for Alice and the jammer
to achieve O(WT )-bit covert and reliable transmission on a continuous-time channel
employing asymptotic bandwidth W Hz for T seconds as T →∞.
3.4.1 Construction
Alice: We employ random coding and generate an i.i.d. Gaussian codebook. If
Alice decides to transmit, she sends the codeword corresponding to her message, an
i.i.d. complex zero-mean Gaussian symbol sequence {fi}Mni=1 with variance E[|fi|2] =
σ2a, where Mn = bαWT c with a constant 0 < α < 1 to be chosen later. Alice’s
transmission power is random: she chooses a power level uniformly at random from
[Pa, Pa + ∆Pa ], i.e., σ
2
a ∼ U [Pa, Pa + ∆Pa ], where Pa and ∆Pa are constants such that
Pa+∆Pa ≤ PA, and then transmits symbols with this average power σ2a for each pulse





where p(t) is a unit-energy square-root raised cosine pulse with roll-off factor β and
bandwidth W , and τi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn is a sequence of i.i.d. pulse delays that are
uniformly distributed in [0, T ]. Alice’s signal xa(t) with t ∈ [0, T ] has an asymptotic
bandwidth W , as shown in Appendix 3.7.1. Since Alice sends Mn pulses, and sends
them at any time in the continuous-time interval [0, T ], she and Bob share an infinite
length key [19] encoding those symbols and time locations unknown to Willie.
Jammer: The jammer transmits an i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian symbol
sequence {v(ξ)i }
Mn
i=1 in time slot [ξT, (ξ+1)T ], where ξ = −C,−(C−1), . . . , C−1. For
time slot [ξT, (ξ + t)T ], it first selects a number of power levels, Kξ, according to a
Poisson distribution, i.e., Kξ ∼ Pois (λj), where λj is a constant to be chosen later.
The jammer then chooses each of the Kξ power levels uniformly in [Pj, Pj + ∆Pj ],
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where Pj and ∆Pj are constants and Pj + ∆Pj ≤ PJ , to transmit its symbols. Note
that the range of the jammer’s power received at Willie needs to cover the range of









Pj, Pj + ∆Pj
]
. The jammer transmits Mn pulses at each randomly
chosen power level in each time slot. Hence, it transmits a total of KξMn pulses in










k,ip(t− ξT − τ
(ξ)
k,i ), −CT ≤ t ≤ CT (3.7)
where {v(ξ)k,i}
Mn
i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian symbols with
variance being the kth power level randomly chosen by the jammer in slot [ξT, (ξ+1)T ],
and {τ (ξ)k,i }
Mn
i=1 is a sequence of Mn i.i.d. pulse delays that are uniformly distributed in
[ξT, (ξ + 1)T ] for each k. Note that although the above form of xj(t) is complicated,
the outer sum will go away when we focus on the single slot of interest in the next
section.
3.4.2 Analysis
Since observations outside of [0, T ] do not help Willie detect Alice under our con-
struction, Willie makes his decision on Alice’s transmission based on his observation
in the slot [0, T ]. When Alice does not transmit, his received signal z(t)|H0 when
t ∈ [0, T ] is given by:









k,i − τj) +N
(w)(t) .
When Alice transmits, Willie’s received signal z(t) | H1 for t ∈ [0, T ] is given by:
















k,i − τj) +N
(w)(t) .
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To obtain an achievability result for covert communications between transmitter
Alice and intended recipient Bob, as assumed the adversary Willie employs an optimal
detector. We will upper bound the performance of the optimal detector by assuming
a genie provides Willie additional information; in particular, we provide Willie with








that may contain a signal from
Alice, the distribution of the number of the jammer’s power levels, the locations of
the pulses, and values of all power levels employed by the jammer and Alice (if she
decides to transmit), but not which power level is employed by whom. We then prove
our achievability result against an optimal Willie who possesses this extra information,
which guarantees achievability against the optimal Willie under the assumptions of
Section 3.2.
3.4.3 Optimal Hypothesis Test









which we term the detection region, is a sufficient statistic for the genie-aided Willie in
deciding between hypothesis H0 or H1. Fig. 3.5 illustrates the power levels observed
by Willie.
Figure 3.5: Willie’s received power levels from Alice and the jammer. An impulse




0 be the number of power levels inside the detection region, K
(2)
0 be the





construction, the power levels sent by the jammer form a Poisson point process on
[Pj, Pj+∆Pj ] with K0 ∼ Pois (λj), under H0; K0−1 ∼ Pois (λj), under H1. Note that





power levels with mean λj and placing them uniformly over [Pj, Pj+∆Pj ] is equivalent
to generating K
(1)





λj and placing them uniformly inside
the detection region, and generating K
(2)








and placing them uniformly outside the detection region. This is critical in the proof
below.
Here we use a Markov chain to prove that the number of power levels in the detec-
tion region is a sufficient statistic for Willie to detect Alice’s presence. An alternative
derivation via the likelihood ratio test (LRT) is provided in Appendix 3.7.2. We de-
note Alice’s decision on transmission as D (which corresponds to hypothesis H1 when
Alice decides to transmit, or H0 when she decides not to); the locations over [0, T ]
of pulses as a vector L, i.e., L is the vector of pulse delays of both the jammer and
Alice (if she decides to transmit); the values of all power levels (within and outside
the detection region) as a vector V; and the original complex symbols sent as S, i.e.,
S consists of the elements in both the vector v and f of symbols (if Alice decides to
transmit). The random variables D, K
(1)
0 , V, L and S form a Markov chain shown
in Fig. 3.6, which illustrates the transition from Alice’s state D to Willie’s received
signal z(t) in [0, T ]. The transitions of the Markov chain are:









when Alice does not transmit (D = H0) and when she does transmit
(D = H1), respectively.
• K(1)0 −→ V,L: Let {Vk : k = 1, 2, . . . , K
(1)
0 }, be the values of power levels
within the detection region, and {Vk : k = K(1)0 + 1, K
(1)
0 + 2, . . . , K0}, be
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the values of the power levels outside the detection region. Given K
(1)
0 , the
conditional distribution of Vk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
(1)
0 , is uniform within the detection
region. Note that K
(2)
0 is independent of D since the pulses sent with power
levels outside the detection region can only come from the jammer, no matter
if Alice transmits or not. Given K
(2)








the distribution of Vk, k = K
(1)
0 + 1, K
(1)
0 + 2, . . . , K0, is uniform outside the
detection region. Let {Lk,m : k = 1, . . . , K(1)0 ,m = 1, . . . ,Mn} denote the
locations in [0, T ] of pulses sent with power within the detection region, and
{Lk,m : k = K(1)0 + 1, . . . , K0,m = 1, . . . ,Mn} denote the locations of pulses
sent with power outside the detection region. Given K
(1)
0 , the distribution of
Lk,m for k = 1, 2, . . . , K
(1)
0 and all m is uniform over [0, T ]. Given K
(2)
0 , the
distribution of Lk for k = K
(1)
0 + 1, K
(1)
0 + 2, . . . , K0 and all m is also uniform
over [0, T ], which is independent from D.
• V,L −→ S,L: The conditional distribution of Sk,m, for k = 1, 2, . . . , K0,m =
1, 2, . . . ,Mn, given Vk, is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with
variance E[|Sk,m|2] = Vk.
Figure 3.6: Markov chain illustrating the transition from Alice’s decision D on trans-
mission, to Willie’s observed signal z(t).
Given the pulse locations and the original complex symbols sent, the signal z(t)
can be constructed from p(t) and the AWGN of Willie’s channel. From the Markov
chain shown in Fig. 3.6, we see that z(t) conditioned on K
(1)
0 is independent of D.
Therefore, K
(1)
0 is a sufficient statistic for Willie to decide between hypotheses H0
and H1.
In particular, hypotheses H0 and H1 can be stated as:
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Let P0 and P1 denote the distributions of the number of power levels observed by















. Theorem 13.1.1 in [85] shows that for the optimal hypothesis test,
PFA + PMD = 1− VT (P0, P1)
where






is the total variation distance between P0 and P1, where the sum is over all k in the
support of P0 ∪ P1. Therefore, by the definition of covertness, if
VT (P0, P1) ≤ ε, (3.10)
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Alice achieves covert communications. Given (3.8) and (3.9):
















































































































































covertness is achieved. This implies that one of two strategies can be employed: 1)
Alice chooses a ∆Pa and the jammer can use an upper bound on d
r
aw to choose λj; 2)
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the jammer chooses a λj and Alice can use d
r
aw to choose ∆Pa . Since under the above
construction, Alice can send Mn = bαWT c pulses with a constant power (which does
not decrease with WT ), O(WT ) bits can be transmitted covertly from Alice to Bob.
3.4.5 Reliability
Since Alice and Bob share a secret key indicating the locations (in [0, T ]) of the
pulses sent by Alice, then Bob can sample at the correct time instances and obtain
an Mn-length vector Y
(a) with each element corresponding to a transmitted symbol
from Alice, plus noise and interference. The interference is due to pulses sent by
the jammer and Alice’s intersymbol interference (ISI), since Alice’s pulses are sent at
random. We upper bound the power of the interference by a constant.
Recall that xa(t) and xj(t) are given by (3.6) and (3.7), respectively. Bob employs




























(b)(t) ∗ p(−t) (3.12)
where q(t) = p(t)∗p(−t) is the zero-ISI pulse, e.g., raised cosine pulse. Per above, Bob
can sample at {τi}Mni=1 and obtain an Mn-length vector Y(a). For any m = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn,
the sample attempting to capture symbol fm is given by:


















q(τm − τ (0)k,i ) +N
(b)(τm) ∗ q(−τm) .



































q2(τm − τ (0)k,i ) + E
[(
N (b)(τm) ∗ q(−τm)
)2]
(3.13)



























N (b)(τm) ∗ q(−τm)
)2]
be the noise power. We will evaluate each term, seper-
ately starting with P
(a)
I .
Let cd > 0 be a small constant, and Md,i be the number of Alice’s pulses whose







, i = 1, 2, . . . , TW
cd
from τm; that is







. Then, since the pulses are uniformly located over [0, T ],






≤ 2αcd . (3.14)
Obviously, on each interval
(





, i = 1, 2, . . . , TW
cd
, a pulse located the
closest to τk maximizes the interference power. Upper bounding P
(a)
I and taking the
















































where C0 is a constant, and (3.15) is obtained by the fact that q(τ) is a raised cosine
pulse, which has a tail that decays in the order of 1
(Wτ)3






converges to a constant as WT → ∞, and σ2a ≤ PA, (3.16) is upper
bounded by a constant.
















Thus, since σ2j ≤ PJ , the power of the jammer’s interference is also bounded by a
constant. Since N (b) has power spectral density N
(b)
0 /2, and q(t) is a raised cosine





0 W/(1 + β), which is independent of T .
By [5, Eq.(9)] and Jensen’s inequality:
EMdi [P
(b)




















where R is the rate of Alice’s transmission. Since Alice uses a transmission power
that is independent of T , her transmission rate is also independent of T . Hence, Bob’s
error probability is upper bounded by a constant. Therefore, under this construction,
Alice achieves both covert and reliable communications with a positive rate.
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3.5 Extension to the Case Without Frame Synchronization
In discrete-time systems, frame synchronization between Alice and the jammer is
assumed in [9]. It is plausible that Alice could listen to the jammer’s signal before
transmitting to determine the slot boundaries and then choose an upcoming slot in
which to transmit. But since waiting for the upcoming slot incurs delay, and having
Alice and Bob agree on the time of transmission makes it challenging for both of them
to perform frame synchronization with negligible error, it is desirable to be able to
transmit without worrying about such frame synchronization.
In continuous-time systems, the construction provided in the previous section
allows Alice to achieve positive rate covert communication when there is perfect
frame synchronization between her and the jammer. But the covert rate in the case
without frame synchronization also needs to be established. In this section, we extend
the construction to relax the requirement that the jammer and Alice both agree (or
know) the codeword slot timing. Like before, Alice sends her pulses within time slot
[0, T ] if she decides to transmit. The jammer transmits in all slots. Without loss of
generality, we assume that drxy = 1 for all transmitter and receiver pairs (x, y), with
the exception that draw is not necessarily equal to one. We will show that positive rate
covert communications can be achieved in continuous-time systems with no frame
synchronization:
Theorem 3.2. Given the system model of Section 3.2 without frame synchronization
between Alice and the jammer, there exists a construction for Alice and the jammer
to achieve O(WT )-bit covert and reliable transmission on a continuous-time channel




The codebook construction is identical to Section 3.4. Over the time period [0, T ],
Alice sends Mn pulses (if she decides to transmit). To avoid Willie’s detection by
simply looking for a pulse starting at time zero, Alice sends pulses during a period
of length T/2 starting at time Ta drawn uniformly at random from [0, T/2]. The
starting time of each pulse is uniformly distributed over a [Ta, Ta + T/2]. As before,
she picks a power level uniformly at random from the power range (Pa, Pa + ∆Pa) to







i=1 is the sequence of i.i.d. code symbols, p(t) is a square-root raised co-
sine pulse with roll-off factor β, {τi}Mni=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. pulse delays that are
uniformly distributed on [Ta, Ta + T/2].
3.5.1.2 Jammer
As shown in Fig. 3.7, the jammer sends multiple length-T
2
pulse trains, each con-
sisting of Mn pulses, having a different power level, and starting at a random point
in time. We term these random points the “starting points”. The location of each
pulse in a pulse train is uniformly distributed over a length-T
2
time interval starting
from the starting point of that pulse train. Let λT denote the density of the starting
points per time T . For each length-T period, the number of starting points, which we
denote as MT , follows a Poisson distribution with density λT , i.e., MT ∼ Pois (λT ).
For each starting point, the jammer picks a power level uniformly at random from
the power range (Pj, Pj + ∆Pj) to transmit one pulse train. The jammer’s waveform







vk,ip(t− τk,i), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where {vk,i}Mni=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian symbols with
variance being the power level associated with the kth starting point, and {τk,i}Mni=1 is
a sequence of i.i.d. pulse delays that are uniformly distributed in a length-T
2
interval
starting at the kth starting point.
Figure 3.7: Pulse trains sent from Alice and the jammer over [0, T ]. An impulse
means a pulse sent by Alice or the jammer.
3.5.2 Analysis
For achievability, we derive an upper bound on the performance of Willie’s optimal









received from Alice, the exact time range [0, T ] Alice will employ
if she decides to transmit, the values of all power levels employed by the jammer and
Alice (if she decides to transmit), the locations of the pulses, the starting points of
all the pulse trains corresponding to each power level employed, and the distribution
of the time instances. Willie does not know which power level is employed by whom,
or for each time instance who starts to send pulses.
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Willie makes his decision on Alice’s transmission based on his observation over
the time interval [0, T ]. Note that any pulse train started outside [0, T ] does not paid
Willie’s detection, and thus the genie-aided Willie can ignore it. When Alice does not
transmit, Willie’s received signal due to pulse trains started within [0, T ] is given by:





vk,ip(t− τk,i − τj) +N (w)(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
When Alice transmits, Willie’s received signal is given by:












vk,ip(t− τk,i − τj) +N (w)(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
3.5.3 Optimal Hypothesis Test
In this section, we show that the number of time instances over [0, T ] that cor-
respond to pulse trains with power levels within the detection region is a sufficient
statistic for the genie-aided Willie to decide between H0 and H1.
We denote M as the number of starting points in [0, T ], and M1 and M2 as the
number of those points that corresponds to pulse trains with power levels within
the detection region (including Alice’s pulse train) and outside the detection region,
respectively. The proof for M1 being a sufficient statistic is analogous to the proof
for K
(1)
0 being a sufficient statistic in Section 3.4.3. We provide it in Appendix 3.7.3.
Since M1 is a sufficient statistic for the genie-aided Willie to detect the presence
of Alice, hypotheses H0 and H1 can be stated as:




























such that covertness is achieved. As before, the maximum interference at Bob can
be upper bounded by a constant, and thus reliability is achieved under the same
construction. Also, Alice can send Mn = αbWT c pulses with a constant power (which
does not decrease with WT ), and thus O(WT ) bits can be transmitted covertly and
reliably from Alice to Bob.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied covert communications in continuous-time sys-
tems, where transmitter Alice wants to reliably communicate with intended receiver
Bob in the presence of a jammer without being detected by warden Willie. We
first introduced an interference cancellation detector for Willie that outperforms the
standard power detector, hence demonstrating that the continuous-time system will
require different approaches than those proposed for discrete-time systems. We then
established constructions that allow Alice to achieve covert communications in differ-
ent cases: when there is perfect frame synchronization between Alice and the jammer,
and when there is no frame synchronization. We proved that O(WT ) covert informa-
tion bits can be reliably transmitted from Alice to Bob on a channel with asymptotic
bandwidth W in T seconds for both cases. In this work, an infinite number of key bits
shared between Alice and Bob is assumed. A direction for future work is to consider




3.7.1 Discussion of the Bandwidth of the Constructions
Here we provide a discussion on the bandwidth of our construction. For the
construction in Section 3.4, each of a constant number Mn of pulses with pulse shape
p(t) is multiplied by its corresponding symbol and then placed with delay randomly




fip(t− τi), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where {fi}Mni=1 is the i.i.d. sequence of zero-mean symbol values, and {τi}
Mn
i=1 is the
i.i.d. sequence of pulse delays. Since the delays are drawn uniformly over only the
interval [0, T ], the process xa(t) is not wide-sense stationary and thus its bandwidth
is not strictly defined. Hence, consider rather the following random process, which is










i − kT )
where f
(0)
i = ai and τ
(0)
i = τi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mn, and the values for the intervals
outside of [0, T ] are chosen independently but according to the same construction as
within [0, T ]. The random process x̃a(t) is wide-sense stationary, and, through stan-
dard digital communication system analysis arguments, has power spectral density
Sx̃a(f) = |P (f)|2, where P (f) is the Fourier transform of p(t). Hence, the bandwidth
of x̃a(t) is the same as that of P (f). Suppose P (f) has a bandwidth of W−∆W , where
∆W is a very small constant, then x̃a(t) has a bandwidth of W −∆W . Observing that








Taking the Fourier transform:
Xa(f) = e
−jπftT sinc(fT ) ∗ X̃a(f) . (3.21)



























































































































(f −W + ∆W )2







where (3.22) is obtained by noting that
∫W−∆W
−W+∆W
|X̃a(v)|2dv is the power of x̃a(t) and
x̃a(t) has power spectral density Sx̃a(f) = |P (f)|2, and (3.23) is obtained by noting
p(t) is a unit-energy pulse.
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3.7.2 Proof of Sufficient Statistic at Genie-Aided Willie Using the LRT
Recall that L denotes the locations of the pulses over [0, T ], V denotes the values
of all power levels, and S denotes the original complex symbols sent by Alice (if she
transmits) and the jammer. For i = 1, 2, . . . , K
(1)
0 and all m, the variables Li,m, Vi
and Si,m are associated with pulses sent with power levels within the detection region,
and for i = K
(1)
0 + 1, K
(1)
0 + 2, . . . , K0 and all m, the variables Li,m, Vi and Si,m are
associated with pulses sent with power levels outside the detection region. The LRT
is given by:
Λ(x, l, v, k) =
Pz(t),L,V,K0|H1(x, l, v, k)
Pz(t),L,V,K0|H0(x, l, v, k)
=
PS,L,V,K0|H1(s, l, v, k)
PS,L,V,K0|H0(s, l, v, k)
(3.24)
=
PS,V,L|H1,K0(s, l, v) · PK0|H1(k)





m=1 PSi,m,Vi|H1,Li,m(s) · PLi,m|H1(l) · PK(1)0 |H1(k)∏K(1)0
i=1
∏Mn

















m=1 PSi,m|H1,Vi(s) · PVi|H1(v) · PLi,m|H1(l) · PK(1)0 |H1(k)∏K(1)0
i=1
∏Mn

























where (3.24) is obtained by the fact that z(t) can be constructed from p(t) given
the locations L and the original complex symbols S sent, and (3.25) by recognizing:
1) PSi,m|H1,Vi(s) and PSi,m|H0,Vi(s) are both zero-mean Gaussian distributions with
variance Vi for i and m; 2) PVi|H1(v) and PVi|H0(v) are both uniform distributions
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over the detection region; 3) PLi,m|H1(l) and PLi,m|H0(l) are both uniform distributions

















3.7.3 Proof of M1 Being a Sufficient Statistic for the Genie-Aided Willie
Recall that D denotes Alice’s decision on transmission. Let L′ denote the locations
of all of the pulses over [0, T ], S′ denote the original complex symbols sent, and
V′ denote the values of all power levels (within and outside the detection region)
employed during [0, T ]. The random variables D, M1, V
′, L′ and S′ form a Markov
chain shown in Fig. 3.8, which illustrates the transition from Alice’s state D to Willie’s
received signal z(t) in [0, T ]. The transitions of the Markov chain are:





·λT when Alice does not transmit (D = H0) and when she does transmit
(D = H1), respectively.
• M1 −→ V′,L’: Let {V ′k : k = 1, 2, . . . ,M1}, be the values of power levels
within the detection region, and {V ′k : k = M1 + 1,M1 + 2, . . . ,M}, be the
values of power levels outside the detection region. Given M1, the conditional
distribution of V ′k , k = 1, 2, . . . ,M1, is uniform within the detection region. Note
that M2 is independent of D since the pulses sent with power levels outside the
detection region can only come from the jammer, no matter if Alice transmits







λT ), the distribution of
V ′k , k = M1 + 1,M1 + 2, . . . ,M , is uniform outside the detection region. Let
{L′k,m : k = 1, . . . ,M1,m = 1, . . . ,Mn} denote the locations (in [0, T ]) of pulses
sent with power within the detection region, and {L′k,m : k = M1+1, . . . ,M,m =
1, . . . ,Mn} denote the locations of pulses sent with power outside the detection
region. Given M1 and the time instances each pulse train starts, the distribution





starting from the time instances corresponding to each power level. Given M2,
the distribution of Lk for k = M1 + 1,M1 + 2, . . . ,M and all m is also uniform
over the length-T
2
interval starting from the time instances corresponding to
each power level, which is independent from D.
• V′,L′ −→ S′,L′: The conditional distribution of S ′k,m, k = 1, 2, . . . ,M,m =
1, 2, . . . ,Mn, given V
′
k , is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with
variance E[|S ′k,m|2] = V ′k .
Figure 3.8: Markov chain illustrating the transition from Alice’s decision D on trans-
mission, to Willie’s observed signal z(t).
Given the pulse locations and the original complex symbols sent over [0, T ], the
signal z(t) can be constructed from p(t) and the AWGN of Willie’s channel. From the
Markov chain shown in Fig. 3.8, we see that z(t) conditioned on M1 is independent




COVERT COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE COVER OF
A RADAR
4.1 Introduction
Covert communication allows a transmitter (Alice) to reliably send messages to
a legitimate receiver (Bob) without being detected by an attentive warden (Willie).
This is crucial for many applications where the existence of a transmission reveals
sensitive information. Previous work studied the limits of reliable covert communica-
tions. Bash et al. first studied such limits over discrete-time AWGN channels in [5],
establishing a square-root law (SRL): Alice can reliably and covertly transmit at most
O(
√
n) bits to Bob in n channel uses of a discrete-time AWGN channel. This SRL
was then established in successive work over binary symmetric channels (BSCs) by
Che et al. in [13], over discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) by Wang et al., [16] and
Bloch, [19], and over multiple-access channels [47] by Arumugam et al.. These works
provide a thorough study of covert communications in common discrete-time channel
models when Willie has an accurate statistical characterization of Alice’s channel to
him.
In covert communications, Willie attempts to determine whether he is only observ-
ing the background environment or a signal from Alice in that environment. Hence,
uncertainty about the environment helps Alice to hide her transmission. Sobers at
al., [9] achieve positive rate by introducing a model with an interference source: an
uninformed jammer that randomly generates interference, hence providing the re-
quired uncertainty at Willie. It is shown in [9] that Alice can covertly transmit O(n)
bits in n channel uses over both discrete-time AWGN and block fading channels.
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In many scenarios, the jammer is assumed to be an intentional jammer that help
Alice to achieve covert communications on purpose [33]. However, this requires an
active non-covert Alice-Bob teammate, which may be difficult to provide in some
situations. For example, in military communications where a transmitter attempts
to covertly communicate with a receiver in enemy territory, it may be difficult to
provide such a jammer. In addition, the jammer in [9] is itself not covert since the
warden knows that the jammer is present and potentially trying to hide something.
Hence, it is often useful to exploit an interference source that already exists in the
environment, such as radars [34,35] and other existing communication sources [36,37],
so that Alice and Bob can operate in such environment and hide under the cover of
the interference. This chapter is the first work that analyzes the fundamental covert
rate of a system that uses an unintentional interference source.
The work in [34] and [35] by Blunt et al. introduces an intra-pulse radar-embedded
communication system where the transmitter attempts to covertly send transmission
symbols to the radar. In order to achieve covertness, the transmission symbols are
embedded with the incident radar pulses, and are hidden behind the backscatter
induced by the radar reflections. The design of intra-pulse covert symbols based on the
incident radar waveform is studied in [34] such that the covert symbols are sufficiently
different from the ambient radar scattering to ensure acceptable bit error rate (BER)
but at the same time sufficiently similar to the scattering to avoid detection by any
adversary.
In this chapter, we exploit the idea of embedding covert symbols into radar pulses
in a standard Alice-Bob-Willie covert communication scenario. When Alice decides
to transmit, each incident radar pulse is remodulated into one communication wave-
form. Alice embeds her transmission waveforms into the scattering of the radar. We
establish the theoretical limit on the covert rate of the transmission between Alice and
Bob. In particular, we show that O(n) bits can be transmitted covertly regardless of
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Willie’s receiver in n samples of a radar pulse. We analyze Bob’s decoding capability
and provide an upper bound to his probability of error, which also shows that O(n)
covert bits in n samples of a radar pulse can be transmitted reliably to Bob. A differ-
ence between this work and [9], where the interference comes from a jammer, is that
here the interference from the radar scattering is correlated, and the variance of the
average power of the local scattering is random. This leads to significant differences
in the proofs of the covert limit and the error probability of Bob’s decoding.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: after introducing the system
model and metric in Section 4.2, we discuss the design of the covert communication
waveform in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we prove the covertness of the system and
analyze the covert rate. We then derive the error probability at Bob to determine
reliability in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 draws the conclusions.
4.2 System Model and Metrics
4.2.1 System Model
Figure 4.1: System model: Alice attempts to transmit covertly to Bob in a commu-
nication system with an illuminating radar.
Consider a radar-embedded covert communication system shown in Fig. 4.1, where
the radar illuminates and introduces scattering due to the reflectors in the environ-
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ment. The transmitter Alice attempts to covertly transmit messages to the receiver
Bob in this environment. In order to do so, she embeds her transmission into the
scattering of the radar to avoid being detected by the warden Willie.
Since each incident radar pulse is remodulated into one communication wave-
form, we are interested in Alice’s ability to covertly transmit in a pulse with length
equal to that of the codeword length n and Willie’s ability to detect such a transmis-
sion. We assume that the environment (i.e, clutter) is dynamic such that it changes
over different pulse repetition intervals (PRI) but is static within each PRI. Let
s = [s1, s2, . . . , sn]
T be the sequence of samples of the illuminating radar waveform
with average power σ2s , where (·)T denotes the transpose operation. Since the am-
bient scattering can be assumed to be a linear time-invariant process, the received
signal due to the clutter can be expressed as a convolution of the radar signal and the
aggregation of the local scattering at a given range delay with respect to the receiver.
Hence, the ambient radar scattering in the surrounding area can be modeled as Sx
where x is a vector of random complex scattering coefficients, and:
S =

sn sn−1 . . . s1 0 . . . 0






0 0 sn sn−1 . . . s1

is an n-by-(2n − 1) matrix of delay shifts of s that characterizes the convolution of
the radar signal with the local scattering, i.e., Sx = (s ∗ x)(n). Due to the scattering
being a collection of the reflections from a large number of scatterers, we assume that
x is a zero-mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian
random vector with variance σ2x. In addition, since the environment (i.e., clutter)
changes over different PRIs, we assume σ2x is random and has a probability density
function (pdf) of fσ2x .
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the distance between any transmitter
and receiver is one. In the case of AWGN channels between all transmitters and
receivers, the received vector at Willie when Alice does not transmit is given by:
z = Sx + u (4.1)
where u is the length-n noise vector observed at Willie, which is an i.i.d. zero-mean
complex Gaussian vector with variance σ2u, i.e., ui ∼ CN (0, σ2u), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. When
Alice transmits, the received vector at Willie is given by:
z = Sx + σcck + u (4.2)
where ck is the length-n codeword Alice transmits, and σc is the square root of Alice’s
transmission power.
Bob observes the channel output y, which is analogous to z but with the substi-
tution of the noise u′ for u, where u′ is an i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian vector
with variance σ2u′ , and the substitution of the radar scattering x
′ for x, where x′ is a
zero-mean random vector with variance σ2x′ , and σ
2
x′ is a random variable with a pdf
of fσ2x .
4.2.2 Metric
Based on his observation z(t), Willie will determine whether Alice transmitted or
not. We define the null hypothesis (H0) to be that Alice did not transmit, and the
alternative hypothesis (H1) to be that Alice transmitted a message. We assume Alice
transmits a message with probability p. Willie tries to minimize his probability of
error P(w)e = (1− p) ·PFA + p ·PMD, where PFA and PMD are the probabilities of false
alarm and missed detection at Willie, respectively. We assume that P(H0) and P(H1)
are known to Willie. Since P(w)e ≥ min(P(H0),P(H1))(PFA + PMD) [5], we say that
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Alice achieves covert communication if, for a given ε > 0, PFA + PMD ≥ 1 − ε [5].
Reliability is measured by the probability P(b)e of Bob’s decoding error averaged over
all codebooks. The transmission is reliable if, for a given ε′ > 0, P(b)e < ε′.
We assume that Willie has full knowledge of the statistical model: The radar
signal s, his background noise power, i.e., σ2u, and the distribution fσ2x of the average
power of the random local scattering of the radar. However, Willie does not know
the exact coefficients x.
4.3 Communication Waveform against Detection
4.3.1 Waveform Design
For a rate of R, we employ random coding arguments and independently generate
K = 2nR codewords {ck, k = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR} as described in detail below. If Alice
decides to transmit, she selects the codeword corresponding to her message, scales it
with σc to embed it into one radar pulse, and sends it over the AWGN channel. Unlike
in [9] where Alice’s codeword is independent of the jammer’s signal, the codeword
ck in our scenario should possess some correlation with the radar scattering to avoid
detection by simply being projected away from the radar signal. A basis within
which to generate Alice’s communication codeword can be obtained by the eigen-







= SSH = VΛVH (4.3)
where V = [v1,v2, . . . ,vn] is the set of n eigenvectors, Λ is a diagonal matrix that
contains the associated eigenvalues {λi}ni=1 in descending order, i.e., λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥
λn, and (·)H denotes the Hermitian operation. Note that VΛVH does not depend on
σ2x in the left-hand side of (4.3) since it is cancelled out by σ
2
x that comes out of the
expectation.
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The work in [34] introduces three design strategies for the communication wave-
form in an intra-pulse radar-embedded system: 1) use a subset of the nondominant
eigenvectors (i.e., eigenvectors associated with small eigenvalues) as communication
waveforms; 2) use a weighted combination of multiple nondominant eigenvectors; 3)
project onto the non-dominant subspace. The general idea behind all three designs
is to let the covert symbols be sufficiently different from the radar scattering to en-
sure acceptable BER at the receiver but at the same time similar enough to avoid
detection by the adversary.
In our work, we will use both the dominant and non-dominant subspace of the
radar scattering. Let bk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, be a normal random vector. We define
Alice’s codeword as:
ck = V(Λ + I)
1
2 bk (4.4)
where I is the identity matrix. Note that bk is the secret key shared only between
Alice and Bob but not Willie.
We want the dimension of the dominant subspace of the radar scattering to be
of the same order as n. Thus, we analyze the matrix Λ in (4.3) containing the
eigenvalues to show that there is a constant fraction of non-negligible eigenvalues as
n becomes large.
Lemma 4.1. Given the continuous-time radar signal s(t) and local scattering x(t), if
the Fourier transform of the windowed (s∗x)(t) is above a constant level for a constant
fraction of time, then a constant fraction of the eigenvalues of SSH as n → ∞ will
also be above a constant level.
Proof. The covariance matrix SSH is an n-by-n Toeplitz and Hermitian matrix. Let
Tn denote this n-by-n Toeplitz matrix. By [67], the sequence {Tn} is asymptotically
equivalent to a sequence of n-by-n circulant matrices {Cn} derived from the Toeplitz
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matrices as n → ∞, and the asymptotic equivalence of the circulant and Toeplitz
matrices implies the individual asymptotic convergence of the eigenvalues for Tn to
those of Cn. By [68, Eq. (5)], Cn
∆
= FHn ∆nFn, where ∆n is a diagonal matrix con-
taining the eigenvalues of Cn, and Fn is the n-by-n (discrete Fourier transform) DFT
matrix. Thus, ∆n ∼ Λn, i.e., the matrix containing the eigenvalues of Tn is asymp-
totically equivalent to ∆n; hence, is also equivalent to the set of diagonal elements
of the covariance matrix FnTnF
H
n of the DFT FnSx of Sx [69]. We aim to study




















Since increasing n will only result in a higher resolution of the DFT, then as long as
the Fourier transform of the windowed (s ∗ x)(t) is above a constant non-negligible
level for a constant fraction of time, there will be a constant fraction of non-negligible
eigenvalues of SSH as n→∞.







when the radar signal is a constant frequency modulated
continuous-wave radar waveform. We observe that as n increases, the shape of the
curves of the eigenvalues stays the same, and there is a constant fraction of non-
negligible eigenvalues as n becomes large.
90
Figure 4.2: Comparison of the eigenvalues (in dB scale) of SSH when n = 5000 and
n = 20000.
4.3.2 Willie’s Detection Capability
Willie’s receiver observes the vector z given in (4.1) and (4.2) when H0 and H1 are
true, respectively, and attempts to decide between the two hypotheses. Since Willie
knows the radar signal and hence can learn the eigenstructure of SSH , he can first
perform (Λ+I)−
1
2 VHz to decorrelate z without loss of optimality, since the operation
is invertible. Then, the two hypotheses become:
• H0: (Λ + I)−
1
2 VHz = (Λ + I)−
1
2 VH(Sx + u);
• H1: (Λ + I)−
1
2 VHz = (Λ + I)−
1
2 VH(Sx + u) + σcbk.
Let us denote w = (Λ + I)−
1
2 VH(Sx + u). Since x is an i.i.d. zero-mean complex
Gaussian random vector, the elements of Sx are jointly Gaussian. Then, w is a
zero-mean complex Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix:
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E[wwH ] =(Λ + I)−
1




























A straightforward test for Willie is a power detector on (Λ+ I)−
1
2 VHz. However, this
threshold test is not necessarily optimal for Willie. Typically, constructing the optimal
detector for Willie is the most challenging task. Thus, many works just assume that
the optimal detector is a threshold test on the power without establishing it. Sobers
et al. in [9] shows that this is not true except for a limited set of distributions. In this
work, we can show that zHV(Λ + I)−1VHz is a sufficient statistic for a genie-aided
Willie, which provides an upper bound for Willie’s detection capability and guarantees
achievability against an optimal Willie. The threshold test on zHV(Λ + I)−1VHz is
optimal when σ2x is uniformly distributed according to [9].
While it is hard to prove the optimality of the power detector on (Λ + I)−
1
2 VHz
when w is not an i.i.d. sequence, we can again upper bound Willie’s performance
by assuming Willie has a powerful receiver that reduces the interference power on
certain eigendirections to result in an i.i.d. observing sequence, i.e., Willie eventually
observes w̃ and w̃ + σcbk when H0 and H1 are true, respectively, where w̃ is an







we denote as σ2w̃. Note that since we want our covert communication scheme to
be effective against an optimal Willie, assuming a genie-aided Willie that is able to
perform such an operation only helps Willie, and hence, as notes above, provides an
upper bound on Willie’s detection capability.
Let z′ = {z′i}ni=1 denote the i.i.d vector observed by the genie-aided Willie after
the above operation and θ denote the variance of the power of z′. Then, θ = σ2w̃ under
92
H0 and θ = σ
2




w̃ is random. The




























Thus, by the Fisher-Neyman Factorization Theorem, the total power
∑n
i=1 |z′i|2 is a
sufficient statistic for the test of the genie-aided Willie, based on which we will prove
covertness of our communication system.
If σ2x is uniformly distributed, then using a similar method to [9] (employing LRT
and stochastic ordering [66]), it can be shown that the optimal test for the genie-aided










where τ is the threshold. However, an optimal threshold test on the power is not
necessary for our proof in Section 4.4.
4.4 Covertness
In this section, we prove the covertness of the system with the genie-aided Willie
when Alice sends the communication waveforms given in (4.4). Assuming we do not
know the distribution of σ2x, we will only consider
∑n
i=1 |z′i|2 being a sufficient statistic
for the genie-aided Willie, and prove the limit on the covert rate in this case.















i=1 |w̃i|2 + σ2cbHk bk. Define a













Define the region for 1
n
∑n
i=1 |z′i|2 in which Willie decides there is no Alice’s transmis-
sion asRH0 , i.e., if 1n
∑n
i=1 |z′i|2 ∈ RH0 , Willie will decide H0 to be true. We also define
the region in which Willie decides that Alice transmits as RH1 (and RH1 = RH0).













































where R denotes the complement of R. Similarly, the conditional probability of




















































k bk can be dropped since it is a very small value due to the average power


















Let χ2l denote a chi-squared random variable with l degrees of freedom. Then,







2n in distribution. By the weak
law of large numbers, χ22n/n converges in probability to one. Hence, for any δ > 0,






























Therefore, for any n ≥ N0, if (t − δ, t + δ) ∈ RH1 ∪ R, then from (4.9), we have
PFA(t) > 1− ε2 . Likewise, following analogous arguments, there exists N1 such that,




k bk ∈ RH0 ∪ R, then from (4.10), we have
PMD(t) > 1− ε2 . Define A as the set of σ
2
w̃ such that:














Then, for any n ≥ max(N0, N1), PFA(t) + PMD(t) > 1 − ε2 if t ∈ A. As for the
complement set A, it can be written as such that:










Then, PFA(t) + PMD(t) < ε2 if and only if t ∈ A.
We will show next that the expected probability that σ2w̃ ∈ A can be upper
bounded by ε
2
when σ2c is set to be a certain constant number. Define a region
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B0 ∈ RH0 ∩R such that B0 contains all intervals in RH0 ∩R that have a length larger
than or equal to 2δ. Since RH0 ∩ R has a finite length, there are only a constant
number (which we denote as m0) of such intervals in B0. Similarly, define a region
B1 ∈ RH1 ∩R such that B1 contains all intervals in RH1 ∩R that have a length larger
than or equal to 2δ. Since RH1 ∩ R has a finite length, there are only a constant

















































where m = min(m0,m1), and fσ2w̃(x) denotes the pdf of σ
2
w̃ (which can be obtained













, and we can
upper bound PFA + PMD as:











Therefore, Alice can transmit with constant average power σ2c and remain covert from




Now we examine Bob’s decoding error probability P(b)e averaged over all codebooks
using similar methods as those in [5]. The key difference is that in our case, Bob
observes colored noise due to the correlation of the interference from the clutter. So
first, in the same way that Willie decorrelates z, Bob performs (Λ + I)−
1
2 VHy to
decorrelate y. Then, when Alice transmits, Bob observes:
(Λ + I)−
1
2 VHy = (Λ + I)−
1
2 VH(Sx′ + u′) + σcbk .
Let w′ = (Λ + I)−
1
2 VH(Sx′+ u′). Then w′ is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random


























Let Bob employ a maximum-likelihood (ML) decoder (i.e., minimum distance de-
coder) to process his observed vector (Λ + I)−
1
2 VHy when codeword ck (i.e. key bk)
was sent. Let Erri(bk) denote the event that the decoder suffers an error, i.e., when
(Λ + I)−
1










Ebk [P (Erri(bk))] (4.15)
where (4.15) is obtained using a union bound.
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If w′ is an i.i.d complex Gaussian random vector with variance σ2w′ , then by [64]:




σ2c ||bk − bi||22
4σ2w′
)]
where Q(·) denotes the Q-function, || · ||2 denotes the L2 norm, and ||bk − bi||22 =
(bk − bi)H(bk − bi) with (bk − bi) ∼ CN (0, 2). However, recall that in our case, w′
is not identically distributed, but rather has covariance matrix given in (4.14). Since
increasing the power of the interference can only degrade Bob’s decoding capability,
we can then upper bound Ebk [P (Erri(bk))] as:
Ebk [P (Erri(bk))] ≤ Ebk,σ2x′
Q



















Let W = 1
2
(bk − bi)H(bk − bi), then:

































































































xn−1e−xdx is the Gamma function, and (4.17) is obtained by




















, P(b)e approaches to









bits in n samples of a radar pulse.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied covert communication that relies on the inter-
ference from a pulsed radar system. Covertness is achieved by embedding the trans-
mission into the scattering of the radar. We have provided a design of the covert
communication waveform. In the case of AWGN channels, we have analyzed the ca-
pability of both the optimal detection at Willie and the decoding at Bob. We have
established that O(n) bits can be covertly and reliably transmitted from Alice to Bob
in n samples of a radar pulse.
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CHAPTER 5
FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS IN DETECTING WHETHER A
SIGNAL HAS BEEN QUANTIZED
5.1 Introduction
In many scenarios, it is important to know whether a received signal was sent
by a friend directly, or whether it was recorded by an adversary and then replayed.
This is the common replay attack (or playback attack) in network security, where the
attacker records messages from a transmitter to a receiver and replays the massages
later to trick the receiver into unauthorized operations. This type of attack can be
used effectively in many real-world applications like remote keyless-entry system for
vehicles [73,74] or text-dependent speaker verification [75].
Similar attacks also occur in radar jamming and deception to protect targets from
being detected by enemy radar systems. Deceptive jamming uses techniques like
range gate pull-off (RGPO) [76] to break a radar lock from the target. The basic idea
is to generate a signal pulse very similar to the one that is reflected by the target,
and then send it a fraction of time later so that the radar’s range gate starts to follow
the false pulse instead of the real reflection. Along with the appearance of digital
radio frequency memory (DRFM) [77], a modern deception jammer can capture and
retransmit the radiation signal of the target, producing a false signal that confuses
the receiver radar and hides the target’s real position or velocity.
Many approaches have been studied to prevent a replay attack in network secu-
rity or deception jamming in radar systems: [78] presents a comparison of different
feature extraction techniques and classifiers for replay attack detection; [79] provides
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a mobile payment scheme based on radio frequency identification that can prevent
replay attack; [80] theoretically studies the detection and classification of jamming
signals by analyzing the adaptive coherent estimator and the generalized likelihood
ratio test; and [81] proposes a DRFM deception jamming detection approach based
on singular spectrum analysis. Although these methods are proposed to efficiently
detect false signals that are recorded and replayed in the field of network security and
radar jamming, the fundamental limits of such attacks with hardware imperfections
has not been explored. In either the replay attack or deception jamming, imperfect
hardware such as quantization or nonlinearities of RF components has a significant
impact on the detection of signals. Here, motivated by our previous work in iden-
tifying transmitters based on subtle imperfections [82]– [84], we initiate a study in
employing such imperfections in detecting a recording of the signal. Learning the
fundamental thresholds for the characteristics of the hardware will provide us with
both theoretical insight and application utility.
We start by studying the theoretical limits in the detection of quantized signals.
Analogous to [5] and [11] where a theoretical limit on the amount of information
transmitted reliably without detection is presented, we are interested in finding the
characteristics of the quantizer employed in a replay system that avoid its detection.
Based on the mathematics of statistical hypothesis testing, we provide a limit on the
quantization bits and the quantizer span such that the quantized signal essentially
cannot be detected. We consider a discrete-time model where signals are discrete-
time series. We will show that if a signal with length m is sent, and the quantization
is uniform with b bits, then 2b = ω (
√





sufficient to avoid detection. Conversely, having 2b = O (
√





results in detection by the observer with high probability as m→∞.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: after introducing the system model
and metric in Section 5.2, we derive the optimal hypothesis test and the probability of
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error in distinguishing the original signal and the quantized signal in Section 5.3. We
prove the achievability and converse results in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 respectively.
Section 5.6 draws the conclusion.
5.2 System Model and Metrics
We employ a discrete-time model with real-valued elements. The framework of
our system is shown in Fig. 5.1, where Alice sends a vector X = {Xi}mi=1 of m
real values and an observer receives a vector Y = {Yi}mi=1. If the signal X is sent
directly, which we term as the “original signal”, then Yi = Xi+Ni for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of Gaussian random
variables, where Ni ∼ N (0, σ2) is the noise on the channel between the observer and
Alice. However, if the signal is recorded and replayed, then the signal X is first
quantized before being sent through the channel; in this case, Yi = Q(Xi) + Ni for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, where Q(·) is the quantization function taking the original signal as
input and outputing the quantized signal.
Figure 5.1: System framework: Alice sends a real-valued vector X and an observer
attempts to classify his observed vector Y as either a vector X + N of the original
signal through the channel or a vector Q(X) + N of the quantized signal through
the channel.
The goal of our work is to study how the parameters of the quantizer affect the
ability of the observer to distinguish the original signal and the quantized signal. In
order to distinguish the two signals, the observer performs a statistical hypothesis
test on his observed vector Y . We define:
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• H0: Y = X + N ;
• H1: Y = Q(X) + N .
Our metric is the probability of error. We assume that the observer uses classical
hypothesis testing with equal prior probabilities of each of the two hypotheses being
true. The rejection of H0 when it is true is known as a type I error (or false alarm),
and we denote its probability as α [85]. The acceptance of H0 when it is not true is
known as a type II error (or missed detection), and we denote β to be its probability.
Thus, the error probability for the observer to distinguish the two hypotheses can be




We also assume that the observer knows X and the realization of the quantization
function Q, and he also knows the variance σ2 of the Gaussian noise on the channel
between the observer and Alice. So, the observer is aware of the statistics of the two
hypotheses H0 and H1.
5.3 Optimal Test and the Probability of Error
The observer’s goal is to determine whether his observed vector is the original
signal sent through the channel or the signal that is quantized and then sent through
the channel. The observer will make his decision based on the optimal test between
H0 and H1. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) is:







where fY |H0(y) is the probability distribution of Y given H0 is true and fY |H1(y) is
the probability distribution of Y given H1 is true.
103
Given that X = x, since the observer knows x andQ(x), we have Yi ∼ N (xi, σ2), i =
1, 2, . . . ,m when H0 is true (i.e., Yi = xi+Ni), and Yi ∼ N (Q(xi), σ2), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
when H1 is true (i.e., Yi = Q(xi) +Ni). Thus, the LRT can be written as:






































Now we would like to derive the error probability for the above test. Let us denote
Zi = 2Yi(Xi − Q(Xi)) + (Q(Xi))2 − X2i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Given H0 is true and X is
known to the observer, then Yi = Xi+Ni and Yi ∼ N (Xi, σ2), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. In this
case, we see that Zi is a Gaussian random variable with mean 2Xi(Xi − Q(Xi)) +
(Q(Xi))
2−X2i and variance 4(Xi−Q(Xi))2σ2. Thus, under the assumption of equal



























]. The quantization step size is denoted as ∆.
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By the symmetry of the problem, the probability of missed detection has the
same form (α = β). Thus, the error probability for the observer to distinguish the
















In order to confuse the observer, we want the error probability Pe to be close to
1
2
so that it is equivalent to a random guess for the observer in distinguishing the
original and the quantized signal, meaning that we want Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any ε > 0 [5].
Conversely, we want Pe ≤ ε for any ε > 0 for the observer to be able to detect the
quantized signal with high probability.
5.4 Achievability
In this section, we will state the achievability theorems under the assumption that
the quantizer in our system is uniform. We seek the sufficient quantization step size
∆ as a function of the vector length m. Intuitively, ∆ should be small, and since we
do not want ∆ goes to infinity, we must have ∆ = O(1) for all circumstances. We
can write ∆ = C
2b
where b is the number of quantization bits and C is a constant.
Theorem 5.1 (Achievability under uniform quantization with no overflows). Suppose
that Alice sends a length-m discrete-time signal that never exceeds the range of the
quantizer, and the quantizer is uniform with b bits of quantization. If 2b = ω (
√
m)







, where C is a constant and σ is the standard
deviation of the noise on the channel), then the observer can only distinguish the
original signal and the quantized signal with error probability Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any
ε > 0.
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i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Since −erf(·) is a convex function, then by Jensen’s inequality we
have:































































≤ ε. This implies that
Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any ε > 0. Thus, 2
b = ω (
√
m) is sufficient to prevent detection by the
observer.
In many scenarios, the transmitted signals can have a wide range of values; for
example, a Gaussian signal would have values ranging from negative infinity to infin-
ity. In this case, the quantizer would have overflows that can assist the observer in
detecting the signal. So, we next assume that the original signal Xi ∼ N (0, σ20), i =
1, 2, . . . ,m. We consider that the system employs quantization with a span of [−l, l].
If its input has value within this span, it outputs the quantized value using the quan-
tization function Q. If the input value is outside of the span, it overflows and outputs
either −l or l. To keep the observer from detecting the overflows, l should be scaled
with the length m of the transmitted signal. Intuitively, l must go to infinity as
m → ∞ or the quantization is readily detected. Thus, we consider l = ω (1) for all
circumstances. We obtain the achievability result in this case as below.
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Theorem 5.2 (Achievability under uniform quantization with overflows). Suppose
that Alice sends a discrete-time signal with length m and the quantizer is uniform







, the observer can only distinguish the original signal and the quantized
signal with error probability Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any ε > 0.




Q(Xi), |Xi| < l
l, Xi > l
−l, Xi < −l
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and the quantization error can be written as:
Ui =

Xi −Q(Xi), |Xi| < l
Xi − l, Xi > l
Xi + l, Xi < −l
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m . (5.3)
Recall that Xi ∼ N (0, σ20) and E[U2i ] = ∆
2
12
when Ui = Xi − Q(Xi) for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Then, we derive the expectation of U2i for the general case in (5.3) as:
E[U2i ] = P (|Xi| < l) ·
∆2
12








































































i.e., the first term of mE[U2i ] goes to zero as m→∞.









































the second term of mE[U2i ] is upper bounded by (5.6), and hence goes to zero as
m→∞.
Therefore, letting 2b = ω (
√




, we get mE[U2i ] → 0 as









≤ ε for any ε > 0. By (5.5), we have
Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any ε > 0.
5.5 Converse
In this section, we provide the converse results under the assumption that the
quantizer is uniform with step size ∆.
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Theorem 5.3 (Converse under uniform quantization with no overflows). Suppose
that Alice sends a length-m discrete-time signal that never exceeds the range of
the quantizer, and the quantizer is uniform with b bits of quantization levels. If
2b = O (
√










for any ε > 0, where C is a constant
and σ is the standard deviation of the noise on the channel), then the observer can
distinguish the original signal and the quantized signal with arbitrarily low probability
of error.
Proof. For the achievability result, we give a tight lower bound (5.2) to the error
probability Pe. Now, we need an analogous upper bound. Using the fact that erf(x) ≥
















and taking the expectation yields:






























If 2b = O (
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any ε > 0, Pe ≤ ε for any ε > 0. Thus, 2b = O (
√
m) is sufficient for the observer to
detect the signal.
Now we consider the case that the system employs a quantizer with overflows; in
particular, the quantizer has a span of [−l, l], and we assume that the original signal
Xi ∼ N (0, σ20), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. We provide the converse result in this case.
Theorem 5.4 (Converse under uniform quantization with overflows). Suppose that
Alice sends a discrete-time signal with length m and the quantizer is uniform with b
bits of quantization levels. Then, if b = O (
√




, the observer can
distinguish the original signal and the quantized signal with arbitrarily low probability
of error.
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Proof. We derive the upper bound for the error probability Pe in the case that the
quantizer has overflows. In this case, the quantization error Ui for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m is
given by (5.3). Following (5.7), we write:



















































































If 2b = O (
√
























which goes to zero as m→∞. On the other hand, recall that l = ω (1), then for any
a ≥ 1, Ba → 0 as l becomes large. This can be seen by noting that if we ignore all of
the constants in B and use the fact that 1 − erf(x) < e−x2 [72], we have B < e−3l2 .
Thus, if 2b = O (
√
m), Pe ≤ ε for any ε > 0.



















, Pe ≤ ε for any ε > 0.
Therefore, if 2b = O (
√




, the error probability Pe at the
observer is arbitrarily small, which establishes the converse result.
5.6 Conclusion
In many applications such as the detection of a replay attack in network secu-
rity or the detection of deception jamming in radar systems, it is important to know
whether a received signal was sent directly, or was recorded and then replayed. Many
approaches to this problem have been proposed in prior work; however, the funda-
mental limits of such detection with hardware imperfections have not been explored.
Thus, we have studied this limit and analyzed the characteristics of the hardware,
in particular the quantizer, that affect the detection. Specifically, if a signal with
length m is sent and a uniform b-bit quantizer is employed, then 2b = ω (
√
m) and a




are sufficient to avoid detection; that is, the error prob-
ability at the observer is bounded as Pe ≥ 12 − ε for any ε > 0. Conversely, having
2b = O (
√




results in detection by the observer




This dissertation explored covert communications, where a transmitter Alice in-
tends to communicate with a legitimate receiver Bob without being detected by a
warden Willie. We focused on addressing critical aspects of moving towards imple-
mentation of covert communications.
Chapter 2 considered a power allocation problem for covert communications using
a standard discrete-time model as a cornerstone to understand the underlying mech-
anisms of covert communications. In particular, with the information about the gain
on the channel between Alice and Bob, Alice can adapt her transmit power to this
gain to achieve a certain rate and meet the requirement on covertness such that Willie
detects the presence of the transmission with low probability. We provided exact op-
timal power adaptation schemes in different scenarios that significantly outperform
standard power adaptation schemes.
In Chapter 3, we studied covert communications in a true continuous-time model.
To demonstrate that the power detector for Willie which is optimal in a discrete-time
model may not be optimal in the continuous-time case, we provided and analysed an
interference cancellation detector that outperforms the power detector. This shows
that Willie can benefit from the continuous-time setting, which has a significant
impact on the true covert throughput of the system. We then established novel
constructions that allow Alice to achieve covert communications on the continuous-
time model in two different cases: when there is perfect frame synchronization between
Alice and the jammer, and when there is no such frame synchronization. We proved
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that O(WT ) covert information bits can be reliably transmitted from Alice to Bob
in T seconds on a channel with asymptotic bandwidth W for both cases.
Since it is useful to exploit an interference source that already exists in the envi-
ronment rather than a friendly jammer, Chapter 4 considers the case where Alice and
Bob operating in an environment with an illuminating radar. We designed a commu-
nication waveform that embeds covert symbols in the radar signals and established a
construction such that the messages are sent under the cover of the radar scattering.
We showed that O(n) bits in n samples of the radar signal can be transmitted covertly
and reliably from Alice to Bob.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we researched fundamental limits of the number of quan-
tization bits and quantizer span of a quantizer that prevent or allow an observer
to determine whether a signal has been recorded and then replayed. In particular,
if a signal with length m is sent and a uniform b-bit quantizer is employed, then
2b = ω (
√




are sufficient to avoid detection.
Conversely, having 2b = O (
√





tion by the observer with high probability as m→∞.
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